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Postmodern Identity-work and Historiography: The ‘Facts’ in the 
Strange Case of Monsieur Federman 
 
 
French born writer and critic Raymond Federman is best known as a practitioner 
and theorist of experimental fiction and as the inventor of terms such as 
‘surfiction’ and ‘critifiction’, both denoting a type of literature where literary 
theory and practice meet in an acutely self-aware form of metafiction. The thesis 
introduced here is an innovative and theoretically acute reading of Federman’s 
two early novels Double or Nothing: A Real Fictitious Discourse (1971) and Take 
It or Leave It: An Exaggerated Second-Hand Tale To Be Read Aloud Either 
Standing or Sitting (1976) which both conventionally are seen as radical 
experiments in fictional and narrative practices, but which rarely are seen as 
having a strong representational, let alone historiographic content. There are at 
least three difficulties which must be overcome before one can speak sensibly 
about what type of literature these novels are, and more generally the genres 
Federman’s oeuvre inscribes itself in. Lisbeth R. Pedersen’s contribution to 
solving these difficulties is substantial and welcome in a field of study where 
there is both too little work done overall (Federman is only the topic of 
approximately 60 entries in the MLA database, despite the fact that he has written 
fiction and theory for 35 years) and where there has been a recent draught in new 
contributions (most Federman criticism and all book-length work on him dates 
back to the 1990s). 
 
The first problem of interpreting and labelling Federman’s work stems from his 
own apparently self-contradictory practice of labelling and categorising his own 
works – a practice which simultaneously underscores and undermines the role of 
history and autobiography in his fiction. “History is bankrupt”, Raymond 
Federman declares in his novel The Twofold Vibration, suggesting that history, 
like money, is a liability in the hands of investors who can lose it, regain it, invest 
in it, sell it, buy it, conceal it, reveal it, make it available. Not only is history a 
fluctuating currency in Federman’s hands, but history is the key that opens a 
whole world of narrative potentiality. As a subject in a historical context, one 
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relates to history’s potential by exhibiting what Federman calls a “sense of 
historical possibilities”. All Federman’s works are saturated with making history, 
and particularly personal history, an active part of memory which never settles 
with ‘solid’ or ‘simple’ facts, but rather develops possibilities and potentialities 
around factual certainties. The tension between individual and collective memory 
is highly operative in Federman’s work. In all memory work he advocates for the 
place of invention as an empowering tool for both the aesthetic practice of the 
novelist and the ethical project of the historian. Yet he is acutely aware of the 
impossibility and necessity of trying to tell stories of history. “I am often asked”, 
Federman writes, “as a survivor of the Holocaust and as a writer: ‘Federman tell 
us the story of your survival’. And I can only answer: ‘There is no story. My life 
is the story. Or rather, the story is my life.’” 
 
Federman’s fictional work is concerned with construing variations on statements 
such as these, which mark a demand for distinguishing history from story, reality 
from fiction. Yet it is paradigmatic within Federman’s understanding of writing 
that it is always “real fictitious” as witnessed by the use of this phrase as the 
subtitle of his novel Double or Nothing. Federman’s capacity to think historically 
is enforced in the idea of remembrance as narrative strategy: one writes in order to 
remember, and one remembers in order to be able to reveal. “It is necessary to 
speak”, he furthermore says, “to write, and keep on speaking and writing (lest we 
forget) about the Jewish Holocaust during the Nazi period even if words cannot 
express this monstrous event. It is impossible to speak or write about the 
Holocaust because words cannot express this monstrous event.” For Federman 
therefore, history is a dialectical bind, which involves a both necessary and 
impossible transmission of these haunting memories. Federman’s notion of 
history is not defined by a rejection of it as an ideology but by creating a mode of 
discourse in which history is open to possibilities. 
 
The second problem with categorising Federman as more than just an abstract 
practitioner of revisionist and relativist postmodern fiction without an ethical edge 
pertains to the state of the available theories on the varieties of metafiction. 
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Standard works such as Patricia Waugh’s book Metafiction. The Theory and 
Practice of Self-Conscious Fiction (1984), and Linda Hutcheon’s extremely 
influential theorising of the role of historiography in a postmodern fiction poetics 
(in A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction, 1988) help furnish 
categories one can test out on Federman’s slippery texts, but ultimately one is left 
with corrective and supplemental work to do in order to find/create a suitable 
category. Even taking into account more recent work on metafiction, such as 
Mark Currie’s selection of and introduction to seminal pieces in the field 
(Metafiction, 1995) which at least takes into account the status of surfiction á la 
Federman as performing the movement typical of metafiction in situating itself 
between fiction and theory, one is left wanting both a more specific mark or 
spectrum of metafiction, and yet also a more spacious field for metafictional 
practices to play in. 
 
The third and final ‘problem’ with Federman is exactly that: a problem only in the 
sense of misguided academic scare-quoting of hard-to-deal-with phenomena: 
Federman is just too funny for his own good. A writer who speaks the 
unspeakable in a humoristic way and openly commits himself to a celebration of 
pla(y)giarism is simply asking for trouble, asking to be bracketed off in some 
obscure category or other. As a playful master of the tragicomic, Federman 
juggles his 4 Xs, his lampshades and the other signifiers he operates with to 
represent the family he lost in the Holocaust with virtuoso performances, using 
calculated effects to strike a balance in the reader’s emotional response between 
laughter, grief, guilt, remorse and relief – stylistically rivalling the degree of 
control desired by an earlier practitioner of the horror of the mundane, Edgar 
Allan Poe, whose short story of a man vocalising from beyond his death I am 
evoking in the title of this introduction. Federman in a sense also speaks as such a 
surplus entity from beyond the pale, blue event horizon the Holocaust forms in 
Western thought, yet he is in no way, shape or form for the heavy of heart and 
mind, as also more recently witnessed by his delightful intervention into the 
currently most explosive genre of life writing, the blog, where one of Federman’s 
alter egos, Moinous, is currently setting new standards of excellence almost every 
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day (http://raymondfederman.blogspot.com). This blog, by the way, is also a site 
where one can meet the author of the present thesis, Lisbeth R. Pedersen in some 
of her more informal guises… 
 
What, then, is it exactly this new study of Federman offers that we have not had 
access to before? First of all we are gifted with an extremely thorough and sober 
account of the dominant theories concerning the aesthetic and political aspects of 
literary postmodernism with a special view to charting the development of the 
American postmodern novel. These theories are critiqued, supplemented and 
corrected in many ways in the course of the work, none more so than Waugh’s 
spectrum of metafictional practices which is extended and reshaped to properly 
accommodate Federman’s work. Thus the thesis has realised its dual aim: Both to 
revise the work done in the 1980s and 90s on the poetics of postmodern narrative 
fiction (long overdue, as also witnessed by the revision currently being done by 
Patricia Waugh herself to her original book) and in the process resituate Federman 
as a crucial contributor to the subgenre of historiographic metafiction, and to 
seriously subject Federman’s novels to a close reading of, among other things, his 
innovative use of concrete prose and prose iconography to enrich his semiotic and 
significatory practice. 
 
This thesis has found its inception in conference papers and other works Lisbeth 
R. Pedersen has produced in the course of her studies at Aalborg University’s 
English programme (notably her contribution to a workshop run by Dr. Camelia 
Elias and myself at the Karlstad conference on Memory, Haunting and Discourse, 
entitled “Memory and potentiality as narrative strategies in the work of Raymond 
Federman”). Lisbeth R. Pedersen’s paper on that occasion, “Frame-breaking and 
concrete prose in the works of Raymond Federman” pioneered some of the ideas 
she presents in more fully developed form in the thesis at hand. 
 
The obvious strengths of this thesis do not only pertain to the scope and 
originality of the work, but also to the clarity of the style employed. The reader 
always feels in the presence of a competent guide and language user as we are 
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taken through the jungle of poststructuralist theories and poetics. Lisbeth R. 
Pedersen’s charting of Federman as a hybrid figure in more ways than one (fiction 
writer and academic, gambler and control freak, French and American, playful 
and serious, Jewish and profane: ‘Moinous’, ‘Namredef’, ‘The old man’ and 
‘Federman’ all rolled into one – ‘double or nothing’, indeed) is as convincing as 
any work on Federman done internationally, and on top we get a much needed 
supplement to the incipient insights within progressive literary scholarship that 
postmodern literature need not be stigmatised as a-political or lacking in ethical 
impact just because it appears in the guise of experimental prose. This thesis urges 
us to look again, and to look deeper. 
 
Bent Sørensen 
Aalborg University 
November 2005 
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1.0 Introduction to thesis 
 
In A Poetics of Postmodernism: history, theory, fiction (1988) Linda Hutcheon’s 
aim is to formulate a poetics of postmodern literature. Her main focus is that of 
defining the postmodern novel, which she does through the concept of 
historiographic metafiction. In brief, this particular type of novel is best described 
as the problematic encounter between historiography and metafiction. That is, a 
type of fiction that is both acutely self-aware and concerned with the (re)writing 
of history. To Hutcheon, this means that the postmodern novel is paradoxical 
since it is both aware of its own status as a self-governing linguistic construct 
while, at the same time, it is grounded in the social, historical and political 
discursive context that we refer to as ‘reality’. It is, in other words, a type of novel 
that simultaneously points in two directions: inward and outward. What I find 
particularly interesting, but also difficult to accept, is the fact that Hutcheon 
throughout her book in an explicit manner completely excludes from her 
definition the very extreme metafictional works by French-American surfictionist 
Raymond Federman. Hutcheon classifies Federman’s novels as unequivocally 
‘late modernist’ and claims that they are anti-referential and autotelic and 
therefore not anchored in ‘reality’. 
 
The works by Federman that I will be discussing in this thesis are his two 
typographically challenging novels Double or Nothing: A Real Fictitious 
Discourse (1971) and Take It or Leave It: An Exaggerated Second-Hand Tale To 
Be Read Aloud Either Standing or Sitting (1976). With these novels, Federman 
presents us with two somewhat thinly disguised versions of his autobiography 
while, at the same time, he explores the problematic concept of representation and 
the limitations of language through the use of radical metafictional techniques. 
Both novels hinge on the (im)possibility of finding an appropriate linguistic 
representation of Federman’s autobiographical experiences, that is, of 
incorporating (both personal and collective) history into metafiction. In my view, 
Federman’s two aforementioned novels can both be seen as examples of how even 
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some radical metafictions may also be said to fall within the parameters put 
forward by Hutcheon. Federman’s two novels are undoubtedly very experimental 
and unconventional in their form, but I believe that there is more to these two 
novels than their conspicuous formal features, playfulness and high degree of self-
reflexiveness – that beneath the surface of the textual maze that Federman creates 
through his many voices, typographical endeavours and countless digressions, we 
may indeed be able to glimpse fragments of the ‘real’ (hi)story too. If only we 
look hard enough. 
 
But before we embark upon our investigation, I want to stress that in criticising 
Hutcheon’s absolute dismissal of Federman’s books as historiographic 
metafictions, I realise, of course, that any attempt of situating literature within a 
given classifying framework or context is always subject to individual 
interpretation, and that such evaluation does not exactly follow any fixed or pre-
established laws. Indeed, I am fully aware of the two-fold nature that any attempt 
at classification cannot escape: inclusion and exclusion. However, this thesis is 
not meant as a complete and general dismissal of Hutcheon’s excellent and very 
comprehensive study of the postmodern enterprise. Certainly, this thesis owes 
much to her extensive work on postmodernism and some sections rely heavily on 
her poetics, as will be evident. But one might tentatively suggest that Hutcheon in 
her firm conviction that Federman’s works are always only about themselves 
neglects the inherent doubleness of Federman’s fiction which is central to her own 
definition of historiographic metafiction: that Federman’s novels are both aware 
of their own fictionality and their grounding in historical facts. That they hinge on 
an irresolvable paradox: the constant and reciprocal interplay between fact and 
fiction, history and story, memory and imagination. 
 
In her aforementioned book, Hutcheon is quick to point out that, 
 
no narrative can be a natural “master” narrative: there are no natural 
hierarchies; there are only those we construct. It is this kind of self-
implicating questioning that should allow postmodernist theorizing to 
challenge narratives that do presume to “master” status, without 
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necessarily assuming that status for itself (emphasis original, Hutcheon 
1992:13). 
 
 
The forthcoming discussion will be yet another narrative construct that deals with 
postmodern critical and literary practices. It will be a challenge to Hutcheon’s 
own narrative on these subject matters. Through my discussion and analysis this 
thesis will, of course, both structure and define the theoretical framework 
presented henceforth as well as Federman’s works. Hence, this thesis should not 
be seen as the reading of Federman, but instead it should be perceived as one way 
of understanding his surfictional novels, namely as historiographic radical 
metafictions. 
 
The main aim of this thesis therefore will be an analysis of Federman’s Double or 
Nothing and Take It or Leave It focused on historiographic metafiction. In other 
words, I want to classify these works in relation to Hutcheon’s definition of 
historiographic metafiction, thus illustrating that although these novels may be 
extreme in their degree of self-reflexivity, they nevertheless remain deeply 
anchored in a historical ‘reality’, and can be seen as textual manifestations of the 
postmodern paradox in that they point both inward and outward at the same time. 
 
Such undertaking inevitably involves a thorough investigation of the concepts of 
postmodernism, poststructuralism, and metafiction, particularly the more radical 
kind, and the various narrative techniques pertaining to such practice. In addition, 
we will need to define the concept of historiographic metafiction and some of its 
main concerns. The first part of this thesis, therefore, will be devoted to 
establishing a theoretical framework that will provide us with a set of analytical 
tools for the actual analysis. In chapter 2.0, I will be using the works of various 
critics, such as Brian McHale, Larry McCaffery, Linda Hutcheon and others, in 
order for me to define some general tendencies within postmodern practices, 
theoretical as well as literary. Furthermore, I will place postmodernism in a socio-
historical context, which allows us to investigate and understand some of the more 
adversarial tendencies discernable in postmodern practices. The third chapter of 
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this thesis will focus on poststructuralism, particularly the works of Jacques 
Derrida and Roland Barthes. Derrida’s perception of language as slippery and its 
relationship to ‘reality’ will be investigated, as well as Barthes’ (radical) 
reworking of concepts such as the text, our approach to it, and also the author. In 
chapter 4.0, I will investigate in detail the concept of metafiction, more 
specifically the metafictional novel, and some of the narrative strategies often 
employed in such writing. The main focus will be on the more radical types of 
metafiction, and I will draw primarily (though not exclusively) on the works of 
McHale and Patricia Waugh. Finally, chapter 5.0 will deal specifically with the 
concept of historiographic metafiction. In this relation, I shall first look into some 
of Hayden White’s observations that have played a crucial role in terms of 
exposing the mechanisms entailed in the production of historical narratives. 
These, as we shall see, are relevant in terms of Hutcheon’s concept of 
historiographic metafiction, which I shall then attempt to define and investigate. 
 
The second part of this thesis will be analytical. Here, I shall first briefly introduce 
Raymond Federman and, then, I will move on to the actual analysis of Double or 
Nothing and Take It or Leave It. These novels will be analysed on the basis of the 
analytical tools established in the preceding part of this thesis. I will offer a very 
close reading of Double or Nothing in particular, while less space will be devoted 
to Take It or Leave It. The reason for this is that there are in fact many similarities 
between the narrative techniques and aims of the two fictions, as will be evident. I 
shall then offer some conclusive remarks to the analysis and, in chapter 7.0, 
conclude this thesis by situating Federman’s surfictional writing within 
Hutcheon’s paradigm of postmodernism and investigate some of the subversive 
qualities discernable in his literature. 
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2.0 Postmodernism 
2.1 Introducing postmodernism 
Much has been said and written about the term ‘postmodernism’ since it became a 
particularly noticeable concept within American literature during the 1960s at a 
time when America experienced a number of social revolutions. The label was 
initially associated with anarchistic and thought provoking ideas as its 
practitioners were engaged in a rethinking of traditional values in Western society 
such as reasoning, rationality and objectivity. These ideas were radically 
undermined and instead a tendency to celebrate and promote ideas of eclecticism, 
complexity, and playfulness could be discerned. Conventional narrative 
techniques and the concept of representation were being redefined through artistic 
creativity that explored the function of fiction and challenged the barriers between 
art and life. Today, however, the term is often notoriously perceived as a highly 
confusing and problematic concept, which is hardly surprising considering the 
various different contexts in which the term has been applied to designate an 
equally high number of different objects and trends. Since the 1960s, the term has 
appeared with increased frequency in the many discourses constituting our 
contemporary culture: architecture, history, music, philosophy, and fashion to 
name but a few.  
 
What I will attempt to do in this chapter is to establish a brief and general 
overview of some of postmodernism’s most prevailing tendencies and concerns. I 
will, in other words, not attempt to give an exhaustive account of this vast and 
complex cultural phenomenon. Instead, I propose to outline some qualities that 
are generally considered distinctively postmodern, which inevitably means that I 
will be constructing only a very limited picture of postmodernism. Also, I want to 
suggest that the concept of postmodernism be placed in an historical context, 
more specifically the anti-foundational 1960s and 1970s since these two decades 
are of significance to the formation and the development of this aesthetic 
phenomenon and the ideologies held by its practitioners. As our starting point, 
however, I want to address the very nature of postmodernism by attempting to 
determine its referent. 
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2.2 Towards a textual construction of postmodernism 
In his introduction to Postmodern Fiction: A Bio-Bibliographical Guide (1986), 
Larry McCaffery warns us that we must “beware of labels, lest [we] be tempted 
into a fruitless search for something that in reality exists in language only” 
(McCaffery (ed.), 1986:xi). Brian McHale, in his influential book Postmodernist 
Fiction (1987), starts off in a similar way by claiming that the referent of 
postmodernism “does not exist” (McHale 1999:4). McHale adds that “[t]here is no 
postmodernism “out there” in the world any more than there ever was a 
Renaissance or a romanticism “out there.” These are all literary-historical 
fictions” (4). Thus, we are dealing with a human made construct that exists only 
on the level of discourse, that is, not per se1. Postmodernism is an artifact that 
comes into existence only when and because we actually talk, write, or think 
about it, i.e., when and because we use the term as a means of classification. 
However, the notion of a non-given classification makes the category itself liable 
to change which is why, as McHale points out, there are numerous ways in which 
postmodernism can be put together (4). The fact that all versions of 
postmodernism, including McHale’s own, are fictional artifacts rather than 
physical objects inevitably means that all constructions of postmodernism are 
subject to the same level of fictionality. Therefore, none can be deemed any more 
or less ‘true’ than any other. There is no single correct interpretation of this label 
which is why postmodernism, as McCaffery points out, is “a term that serves most 
usefully as a general signifier rather than as a sign with a stable meaning” 
(McCaffery (ed.) 1986:xi).  
 
The emphasis on the fictional reality of postmodernism obviously has some 
implications in terms of the truth-value traditionally assigned to the discipline of 
literary criticism; something that McHale makes explicit (we will investigate this 
in more detail in chapter 3.0 on ‘poststructuralism’). In doing so, he questions the 
status and the veracity of his own discourse and challenges the very nature and 
                                                 
1 The idea that postmodernism exists only on a discursive level is something that many critics agree on. 
Others who share this belief are, for example, Bran Nicol (Nicol (ed.) 2002:2), and Matei Calinescu 
(Calinescu 1988:297). 
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function of literary criticism and its concern with conceptualisation. That is, 
McHale is studying the existence of the (textual) categories that we fabricate in 
order for us to attempt to make sense of the world around us. In McHale’s 1984 
conference paper that formed the basis for Postmodernist Fiction, he makes even 
more explicit his disbelief that theoretical discourses can ever be viewed as 
objective. He proposes instead that such discourses are always tactical and plotted 
with a specific goal in mind; “all definitions in the field of literary history, all acts 
of categorization or boundary-drawing, are strategic” (emphasis original, McHale 
in Nicol (ed.) 2002:278). These are interesting and, to some, bold postulations that 
highlight a sense of contemporary distrust towards any claims about reliable 
‘truths’ or ideologies that are universally applicable or naturally given. Instead, 
postmodernism is marked by a strong tendency to emphasise and deliberately 
flaunt the idea of constructedness that we project onto the world in our attempt to 
grasp it, rather than the idea of discovery or perception. Postmodernism is 
concerned with interrogating the way(s) in which concepts and systems are 
linguistically fabricated and thus both generate and constitute ‘reality’. Bran 
Nicol, too, in his definition of postmodernism stresses issues concerning both the 
nature and the function of such cultural artifacts. He claims that postmodernism 
can be viewed as “a mode of cultural awareness informed by the conviction that 
everything is, in fact, cultural”, i.e., “everything is constructed, mediated, put 
there by someone for a particular reason” (emphasis original, Nicol (ed.) 2002:3-
4). Postmodernism, in other words, is an artifact that critics construct strategically: 
a type of classification that is aware that it, as well as the practices it is used to 
denote, lacks a sense of ‘innocence’ and objectivity. 
 
2.3 Ontological questioning as the dominant 
In Postmodernist Fiction McHale embarks upon an extensive study informed by 
one single idea, namely that postmodern fiction foregrounds one particular kind of 
questioning that is acutely concerned with ontology. McHale’s approach is 
formalistic and in order for him to pursue his thesis, he makes use of Roman 
 16 
----------------------------------------[X – X – X – X]--------------------------------------- 
Jakobson’s concept of ‘the dominant’2. McHale argues that “postmodernist fiction 
differs from modernist fiction just as a poetics dominated by ontological issues 
differs from one dominated by epistemological issues” (McHale 1999:xii)3. That 
is, postmodern writing can be seen as privileging ontological questioning over 
epistemological, which is often manifested in postmodern texts through 
experimentation with, for instance, the text’s formal features, frame structure(s), 
and themes. 
 
McHale argues that epistemological questioning is the dominant kind in modern 
fiction and that it involves a quest for knowledge. Inherent in epistemological 
questioning is the conviction that there is reliable knowledge to be found and that 
someone actually holds the key to the answers (9). Epistemology is informed by 
the strong belief that it is in fact possible to know and explain the world and our 
position in it through logical thinking and a rational approach. It is concerned with 
the circulation of knowledge; how we know what we know without ever doubting 
that there is a transcendent ‘truth’ to be known. Epistemology thus hinges on the 
assumed presence of ‘grand narratives’ which serve as a valid framework to 
which one can turn for answers and explanations. In postmodernism, McHale 
argues, these “various stories (Enlightenment, Marxist, Hegelian) about human 
emancipation and progress that once served to ground and legitimate knowledge, 
are no longer credible” (McHale 2002:5). Whence, the opposing postmodern idea 
of ontology prevails4. 
 
                                                 
2 Any given dominant depends upon the kind of questions we ask of the text in question as well as the 
constructed platform from which we choose to examine this text (McHale 1999:6). It is, in other words, 
an analytical tool that is both strategic and changeable. 
3 In Metafiction. The Theory and Practice of Self-Conscious Fiction (1984), Patricia Waugh makes a 
similar distinction between the tendency in modern fiction to favour epistemology and the emphasis on 
ontology in postmodern fiction (Waugh 2001:102).  
4 In texts that favour the notion of ontology, epistemology is not completely expelled from the picture. 
Rather, and this is something McHale stresses, in postmodern literature, “epistemology is 
backgrounded, as the price for foregrounding ontology” (emphasis original, McHale 1999:11). Thus the 
dominant is a flexible entity that indicates a specific hierarchy in terms of how a given text should be 
interrogated. Any postmodern text, McHale argues, can of course be examined in terms of 
epistemology, however, “it is much more urgent to interrogate it about its ontological implications” 
(emphasis original, 11). 
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Ontology is the branch of philosophy that is concerned with the nature of being or 
existence, that is, it focuses on modes of being rather than knowing. It studies 
different ranges of categories of existence (above, McHale was studying the 
existence of postmodernism as a discursive construct), of which two are 
particularly relevant to this study, namely those concerning ‘reality’ and fiction. 
Typical ontological questions would be: What is a world? Do we actually know 
that it is there at all? Of what and how is a world constituted? How does the ‘real’ 
world relate to the projected world(s) of a text? Are we talking worlds rather than 
world? What happens when worlds clash, overlap, or co-exist? Such ontological 
questions in postmodernism function as generators of instability and uncertainty. 
Being, in postmodernism, is scattered across multiple worlds that often exist 
simultaneously, thus blurring or emphasising the ontological boundaries between 
such worlds. The epistemological idea of fixed knowledge is undermined and 
challenged in the postmodern text, which in a self-conscious manner exposes its 
own status as artifact, often creating a state of doubt about even its own projected 
‘reality’ and its relationship to the empirical world. In many cases, postmodern 
writers employ metafictional strategies that fall under the heading of frame-
breaking (see section 4.6) in order for them to interrogate the dichotomous 
relationship between the world of fiction and the empirical world. 
 
2.4 Parody: simultaneous inscription and subversion 
Linda Hutcheon in A Poetics of Postmodernism: history, theory, fiction claims 
that the most important and central function of postmodernism is its attempt at 
rendering problematic the commonsensical and ‘natural’. Her particular focus is 
on history and the knowability of the past (this will be specifically addressed in 
the chapter 5.0 on ‘historiographic metafiction’). Like McHale, Hutcheon bases 
her project on one main thesis: that postmodernism is always inherently double 
and self-contradictory and, therefore, she considers parody the perfect postmodern 
form. However, parody in Hutcheon’s study has undergone a reworking that adds 
to it an important critical dimension. Hence, her notion of parody “is not the 
ridiculing imitation of the standard theories and definitions that are rooted in 
eighteenth-century theories of wit” (emphasis original, Hutcheon 1992:26). 
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Instead, Hutcheon suggests that parody be redefined “as repetition with critical 
distance that allows ironic signalling of difference at the very heart of similarity” 
(26). Thus, Hutcheon’s concept of parody is characterised by a double process: it 
both incorporates and subverts that which it parodies at the same time. Its mode of 
operation is in other words paradoxical and hinges on the notion of undecidablity. 
By its continuous and simultaneous installation and subversion, postmodernism 
can never offer any “answers that are anything but provisional and contextually 
determined (and limited)” (xi). This is also evident from Patricia Waugh’s 
understanding of ‘paradox’, which she sees as “a form of contradiction. It makes 
an assertion at the moment that it denies that assertion (and vice versa). It offers a 
finite statement which only infinity can resolve” (Waugh 2001:141). In doing so, 
the paradoxical mode of operation opens up to the prospect of endless repetition. 
In offering no fixed answers – no stable knowledge - such paradoxical discourses 
inevitably make explicit the irresolvable contradictions that they set up. Thus, 
postmodernism strives towards and delights in a proliferation of doubt and 
multiplicity – towards asking questions rather than providing answers. 
 
The use of parody therefore makes it possible for postmodern writers to seriously 
challenge and rethink some of the traditional beliefs and conventions that have 
shaped our culture since, roughly speaking, the Enlightenment. Making use of this 
form thus works as a critique from within that destabilises, interrogates, and 
renders problematic notions such as “[h]istory, the individual self, the relation of 
language to its referents and of texts to other texts” (Hutcheon 1992:xiii). These 
concepts, Hutcheon stresses, are questioned and challenged in postmodern 
practices (theoretical as well as fictional) but never downright rejected. The 
concept of parody always involves a sense of retrospection because it incorporates 
elements from an already existing, and therefore historical, text. That is, 
postmodern parody always “uses its historical memory” (35) and in doing so, it 
always engages in a dialogue with art forms and discourses that chronologically 
precede it. Postmodernism is thus clearly aware of its own position within the 
(constructed) history of literature and other art practices.  
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Postmodernism not only criticises that which it parodies but falls prey to its own 
scrutiny in the process. It undermines not only discourses that have traditionally 
been granted a status as master narratives, but also its own status as a new master 
narrative about the incredibility of such authorial discourses. Hence, 
postmodernism is evidently a paradoxical concept that is critical of any notion of 
structures and foundations that we have come to take for granted. At the same 
time, it is also carefully self-reflexive of what it does; of its own mode of 
operation and its functions. This tendency to question everything, it is often 
argued, adds to postmodernism a political dimension: it challenges the ideological 
concepts and institutions that have shaped our understanding of literature and 
‘reality’ for centuries and urges us to rethink them. Postmodernism points to such 
notions (including itself) as strategic and discursive inventions and constantly 
attempts to render them problematic from a position that it knows can never be 
anything but internal and provisional. 
 
2.5 The postmodern period: non-conformity through innovation 
It is generally agreed that social and aesthetic revolutions go hand in hand and 
often result in what can be called a paradigm shift5. Certain historical events and 
philosophical tendencies inevitably have major effects on how we think, 
experience and understand our being in the world. Such pervasive shifts have 
comprehensive effects and are generally reflected in the aesthetic practices of a 
given moment in time. Postmodernism, I want to argue, should be viewed as such 
very reflections on, and aesthetic responses to, a perception of ‘reality’ that can 
still be considered fairly contemporary. It is necessary to situate this concept 
within the chronologically constructed narrative that we refer to as our (literary) 
history (even if this means granting such narrative a sense of master status in what 
would seem a very unpostmodern manner) if we are to gain a proper 
understanding of postmodernism’s critical properties; of its refusal to wholly 
conform. We will therefore place postmodernism in the historical context of the 
anti-foundational and innovative 1960s and 1970s and narrow down our scope of 
investigation to encompass only American postmodern metafiction produced 
                                                 
5 See, for instance, McCaffery 1986:xv, and Calinescu 1988:266-7.  
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within these two politically turbulent decades. It should therefore be evident that I 
am not in agreement with those who propose that postmodernism be studied as an 
ahistorical method or ‘mood’, as, for instance, the Italian writer and critic 
Umberto Eco has suggested. Eco maintains that postmodernism “is not a trend to 
be chronologically defined, but, rather, an ideal category—or, better still, a 
Kunstwollen, a way of operating” (emphasis original, Eco 1995:66). In my view, 
such study of postmodernism means reducing the concept to a set of formal 
features that does not take into account the oppositional function of such aesthetic 
devices. By defining postmodernism in an historical context, we can relate it to 
the commonly agreed perception of ‘reality’ that characterised America during the 
1960s and 1970s, which is crucial if we are to understand the refusal of many 
postmodern writers to simply conform to this perception. Instead, most 
postmodern writers at the time explicitly confronted “the unreality of reality”, as 
Federman puts it, with the aim of getting “closer to the truth of the world today” 
(Federman 1993:34). 
 
2.6 Tracing postmodernism 
Postmodernism obviously did not emerge overnight but remains deeply rooted in 
(literary) history, and many links have often been made to its preceding 
movement of modernism; particularly one of modernism’s many avatars: the 
historical avant-garde. While a thorough examination of the avant-garde is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, it is however necessary to briefly investigate its insistence 
on innovation and extreme experimentation as well as its aim to initiate social 
reform, which are both detectable in postmodern practices6. 
 
Peter Bürger, in Theory of the Avant-Garde (1974), defines the aim of the avant-
garde “as an attack on the status of art in bourgeois society [...] as an institution 
that is unassociated with the life praxis of men” (1996:49). The bourgeoisie’s 
                                                 
6 This brief discussion of the avant-garde is greatly oversimplified and merely serves as an 
introduction to some of the movement’s general tendencies in order for us to establish a sense of 
historical background for postmodernism. When I refer to the historical avant-garde in the 
singular, it is for the sake of simplicity. The historical avant-garde consisted of numerous different 
schools. 
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perception of art as autonomous and independent from any social and historical 
context is thus negated by the avant-gardist who takes the opposite course by 
attempting to reintegrate art into social life through provocation and shock (46-7, 
52). Artistically, the avant-garde thus works as an alternative and rebellious 
direction to that of the cultural establishment. By the 1960s, however, the avant-
garde movement could go no further as its insistence on deliberately operating in 
a radically new and controversial manner had itself become accepted as art by the 
very bourgeoisie whose perception of art the movement initially set out to criticise 
(53). Once shock becomes the norm, the element of surprise – the intended effect 
- naturally diminishes, or remains totally absent. Even if the historical avant-garde 
has somewhat been silenced today, its distinctive tendency to advocate social and 
political progress through innovation has greatly influenced the early American 
postmodernist movement. As Andreas Huyssen notes,  
 
[I]t was this specific radicalism of the avantgarde, directed against the 
institutionalization of high art as discourse of hegemony and a machinery of 
meaning, that recommended itself as a source of energy and inspiration to 
the American postmodernists of the 1960s (Huyssen 1986:192-3). 
 
 
Although the historical avant-garde’s influence on early postmodernism is crucial, 
the two movements differ greatly in terms of their conception of time and the past. 
Whereas the avant-garde is often defined by its “rejection of the past and by the 
cult of the new” even if this is achieved “in the sheer process of the destruction of 
tradition” (Calinescu 1988:117), postmodernism instead engages in an ironic 
dialogue with the past and artistic practices of earlier periods (cf. section 2.4). 
Postmodernism looks to the past and to tradition with an ironic awareness of its 
own position in a contemporary context. From this position postmodernism does 
not seek to destroy but instead destabilise and reinterpret the past (and our 
knowledge of it) by exposing it as discursive manifestations of Western ideology 
and reasoning. Thus, postmodern practices tend to operate “in a field of tension 
between tradition and innovation, conservation and renewal, mass culture and 
high art, in which the second terms are no longer automatically privileged over the 
first” (Huyssen 1986:216-7). Hence, traditional Western notions of history, 
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identity, meaning, literature, and ‘reality’ are deliberately suspended, not 
demolished, within a (textual) realm in which discordant indeterminacies are at 
constant play. 
 
2.7 The rise of postmodernism 
As we have seen above, the influence of the historical avant-garde is crucial in 
terms of the formation of American postmodernism. However, we need also 
address other factors such as certain socio-historical issues in order for us to 
understand sufficiently why this particular type of writing became noticeable in 
America during the 1960s and 1970s. McCaffery is one critic who deals 
specifically with postmodernism in this context, and he tentatively links the 
emergence of American postmodernism to the assassination of John F. Kennedy 
on November 22, 1963. McCaffery suggest that on this day,  
 
postmodernism was officially ushered in—at least in the United States—
since that was the day that symbolically signaled the end of a certain kind of 
optimism and naivete in our collective consciousness, the end of certain 
verities and assurances that had helped shape our notion of what fiction 
should be (McCaffery (ed.) 1986:xii). 
 
 
This historical event and the conspiracy theories that followed abruptly brought to 
an end the optimistic, rational and trusting perception of America and its official 
institutions that the majority of its inhabitants held in the post-World War II years. 
In addition, other factors such as the constant threat of nuclear war, the civil rights 
movement, and the controversial Vietnam War caused political turbulence, social 
unrest in the country and a proliferation of counter cultures. Something had 
clearly happened to the collective perception of  what constituted the formally 
agreed ‘reality’ of America and this lead certain writers at the time to question and 
reassess the possible functions of their works in a contemporary context. This was 
expressed through a radical attack on traditional realism with its well-made plot, 
its predictable and stable characters, and its aim of projecting a coherent and 
‘credible’ fictional universe. These notions were subject to much experimentation 
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as conventional narrative techniques were subverted and imbued with explicit 
self-reflexiveness in the attempt to redefine the customs of fiction and thus make 
literature more pertinent and contemporarily relevant.  
 
The extreme methods often employed by postmodern writers at the time had great 
consequences for the more conventional novel; a novel that critics were busy 
declaring ‘dead’, while postmodern writers such as John Barth instead stressed 
“the used-upness of certain forms or the felt exhaustion of certain possibilities” 
and added that this should not be seen as “a cause for despair” (Barth 1997:64). 
These writers, Federman argues, aimed at “creating a rupture in order to revive an 
“exhausted” genre—a genre that could no longer accommodate and express the 
extravagant notions of time and space of modern reality” (Federman 1993:21). 
This resulted in a new type of writing in which a strong sense of distrust and 
doubt towards the discourses that officially constituted America was clearly 
discernable by its deliberate attempt to no longer express “a firm belief in a 
commonly experienced, objectively existing world of history” (Waugh 2001:6). 
Instead, the more traditional modes of thinking, ideologies, and orthodoxies were 
exposed as mere linguistic constructs dominated and controlled by the political 
and economic system. Indeed, numerous postmodern texts, as McCaffery points 
out, “for all their experimentalism, metafictional impulses, self-reflexiveness, 
playfulness, and game-playing, have much more to say about history, social 
issues, and politics than is generally realized” (McCaffery 1986:xvii).  
 
Paul Maltby too is particularly concerned with the political dimensions of 
postmodern writing. In his Dissident Postmodernists: Barthelme, Coover, 
Pynchon (1991), Maltby distinguishes between two currents within postmodern 
texts: ‘introverted’ ones and ‘dissident’ ones; the major difference being “one of 
degree: the dissident tendency may be distinguished from the introverted by its 
heightened perception of the politics of language” (emphasis original, Maltby 
1991:37). Maltby argues that introverted postmodern works generally have little 
interest in the external world, but focus instead on what can be done with 
language by exploring “the individual ego’s experience of entrapment in webs of 
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narrative fiction […], mediating from within an enclosed, monadic environment” 
(39). Dissident postmodern writing, on the other hand, explores the word in the 
world and the political issues connected with language and cultural discourses. It 
is concerned with how systems and control are diffused through the power of 
language. As Maltby states, dissident postmodern “writers are acutely conscious 
of meaning as “narrative.” But they are also conscious of meaning as imbued with 
the tensions of power-relations and conflicting value-systems” (my emphasis, 39). 
Like the introverted postmodernists, the dissident postmodernist then clearly 
acknowledges any notion of meaning as purely fictional. However, looking 
outward too, the dissident postmodernist adds an adversarial dimension to his 
work due to his explicit concern with disputing and unmasking the strategic 
linguistic mechanisms inherent in hegemonic discourse(s). Through his praxis, 
Federman deconstructs Maltby’s distinctions, which I shall return to later. 
 
Hence, I will argue throughout this thesis, that the non-conforming and explicitly 
self-reflexive writing that proliferated in America during the 1960s and 1970s 
should not only be viewed as personal aesthetic statements. It is equally important 
to examine carefully such postmodern works in terms of their oppositional 
qualities and their function as social and political acts of subversion in a 
postmodern age. Nevertheless, it is absolutely crucial to point out that although 
the 1960s and 1970s did give rise to a hitherto unseen high number of radical 
metafictional American discourses, in which a strong emphasis on their own 
coming into being and status as linguistic constructs can be discerned, not all 
American prose published within this period can be considered postmodern. It 
would therefore be fraudulent to simply use postmodernism as a synonym for that 
which is (still fairly) contemporary. 
 
In sum, we have defined postmodernism as a discursive construct used as a means 
of classifying certain aesthetic practices that are marked by a deliberate attempt to 
question and render unstable any notions of ideology and reliable ‘truths’ that we 
have hitherto taken for granted. Postmodernism points to such orthodoxies, that 
have helped shape our notion of ‘reality’ for centuries, as human fabrications 
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rather than natural givens. This tendency to generate doubt is often discernable 
predominantly through ontological questions and the double and self-
contradictory mode of parody, thus adding a critical and political dimension to 
postmodern practices. Placing postmodernism in the historical context of the anti-
foundational 1960-70s’ America, we traced its formation to these turbulent 
decades in which certain writers refused to wholly conform to Western ideology 
and reasoning by attacking and redefining more conventional modes of literature, 
thus rendering these outdated. 
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3.0 Poststructuralism 
3.1 Poststructuralism: practising auto-critique 
When dealing with the concept of postmodernism, it is crucial also to investigate 
ideas formulated by the many discourses that constitute poststructuralism, which 
interestingly enough also emerged during the 1960s and 1970s. Although the two 
cannot be used synonymously, there are certain significant areas of overlap that 
are important to this study. One could perhaps tentatively suggest that most 
postmodern metafictional practices often employ methods proposed by 
poststructuralism. Particularly poststructuralism’s overt concern with undermining 
and rethinking traditional notions of rigid structures and referentiality by flaunting 
and destabilising the linguistic systems through which such notions become 
meaningful to us. Like postmodernism, poststructuralism is anti-foundational and 
paradoxically self-reflexive. Gaining momentum in France around 1966-7, 
poststructuralism did not influence Anglo-American critical theory until around 
the mid-70s, when some of its key texts were translated from French into English 
(Rice & Waugh (eds.), 1996:114-5). Offering a radical attack on particularly the 
ideas proposed by the structuralist movement, poststructuralism’s relationship to 
its predecessor is nevertheless ambiguous. On the one hand, poststructuralism can 
be seen as a further development of some of structuralism’s most basic 
assumptions such as the idea of binary oppositions and the self-referentiality of 
language. On the other hand, poststructuralism also works as a critique of its 
forerunner which is most pronounced by the former’s explicit self-reflexiveness 
and demolition of scientificity. I will not give a lengthy account here of 
structuralist thought, but instead offer brief summaries of its main ideas at places 
where these will help us gain a sufficient understanding of poststructuralism. The 
emergence of poststructuralism is of course a collective effort, however, I want to 
focus primarily on two key figures whose influences on the field of literary 
criticism have been tremendous: French philosopher Jacques Derrida and French 
critic and theorist Roland Barthes. 
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3.2 Derrida’s deconstruction 
Derrida is most famous for the word ‘deconstruction’, which is both complex and 
somewhat impossible to define in absolute terms because it always re-doubles 
upon itself. Deconstruction can only ever be approximated definition-wise 
because it “is not a regression toward a simple element, toward an indissoluble 
origin” (emphasis original, Derrida in Kamuf, 1991: 273). Deconstruction 
therefore cannot be described satisfactorily within the framework of traditional 
Western thought in which notions such as “simple element” and “indissoluble 
origin” are valued and desired (270). It is these conventionally favoured notions 
of Western reasoning that Derrida radically challenges in a playful and self-
reflexive manner.  
 
In this section, I want to pay particular attention to Derrida’s view on the 
relationship between the signifier (written or acoustic image) and the signified 
(mental concept or meaning), which together constitute the sign. As we shall see, 
this relationship has important consequences both in terms of the conventional 
notion of stable meaning as well as the relationship between the text and the world 
– factors that are crucial in terms of postmodern metafiction.  
 
In Of Grammatology7, Derrida offers a thorough examination of the history of 
Western metaphysics, which he argues has always been marked by a tendency to 
favour speech over writing. This inclination towards hierarchising, Derrida 
extends to encompass a whole system of beliefs that has constituted Western 
thought since the days of Plato. Derrida refers to this as ‘logocentrism’ and 
describes it as a “metaphysics of presence” (Derrida 1997:49). The metaphysics of 
presence is based on the assumption that there is such a thing as a “transcendental 
signified” (49); an absolute presence of ideal meaning and consciousness that 
exceeds any signifier. Thus, presence is paramount to logocentrism and becomes 
that which is always valued highest. According to Derrida, logocentrism strives 
towards subordinating and excluding that which it considers absent, different, 
chaotic, uncertain, supplementary, or non-ideal – the other – in order to sustain 
                                                 
7 First published in French in 1967, and translated into English in 1976. 
 28 
----------------------------------------[X – X – X – X]--------------------------------------- 
the, to Derrida, illusion of a “full presence summed up in the logos” (71). 
Repressing the notion of absence is the only way in which such metaphysics can 
uphold its ideological view of an absolute presence of meaning, being, and truth. 
Derrida attacks this traditional idea by undoing its founding order of binary 
oppositions that are based upon ascribed notions of superiority and inferiority. 
Derrida is not concerned with simply reversing this hierarchy. Instead he attempts 
to show that the difference between the two constituting elements of a given 
binary opposition is never rigid or absolute. Rather, any given element is always 
already marked by a sense of otherness since “each element appearing on the 
scene of presence, is related to something other than itself, thereby keeping within 
itself the mark of the past element, and already letting itself be vitiated by the 
mark of its relation to the future element” (Derrida, 1982:13). Thus, Derrida shifts 
the orthodox emphasis on stable and definite orders and systems to that of the 
process of signification. As an example, he uses the notion of how logocentric 
thought privileges speech as the signifier (representation) of man’s thoughts by 
opposing it to writing which is simply reduced to a status of the signifier of 
speech (Derrida 1997:11), hence its secondary status as a “signifier of the 
signifier” (7) (representation of representation). According to Derrida, the 
primacy assigned to speech is invalid since, 
 
“Signifier of the signifier” describes […] the movement of language: in its 
origin, to be sure, but one can already suspect that an origin whose structure 
can be expressed as “signifier of the signifier” conceals and erases itself in 
its own production. There the signified always already functions as a 
signifier. The secondarity that it seemed possible to ascribe to writing alone 
affects all signifieds in general, affects them always already, the moment 
they enter the game. There is not a single signified that escapes, even if 
recaptured, the play of signifying references that constitute language 
(emphasis original, 7). 
 
 
In Derrida’s view, both written and oral language – or any type of sign for that 
matter - is thus always already subject to the same endless process of signification 
– it participates in a “play of signifying references” which means that the signified 
is forever on the move; it can never be brought to a definitive halt and thus 
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become “transcendental”, or reach its origin as a full presence. In order to 
describe this constant movement and the mechanisms at work (or ‘play’, to use a 
more appropriate terminology) in the process, Derrida came up with the term 
‘differance’ which he refers to as “an economic concept designating the 
production of differing / deferring” (23). The concept of differance thus denotes a 
double quality inherent in all signs from which we derive and construct meaning. 
 
Firstly, meaning is generated by way of difference (that which it is not) which 
Derrida bases on an idea initially proposed by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de 
Saussure8 whose influence on the structuralist movement is paramount. Saussure 
claimed that language should be viewed as self-referential because it, as a 
signifying structure, works according to an underlying and synchronic system in 
which stable meaning is generated by way of difference. That is, a given sign 
always defines its meaning negatively in relation to its binary opposition: that 
which it is not (“differing”) (Saussure 1974:117). It is thus differences between 
signifying units within a given system of signification that are seen as generators 
of stable meaning – outside of this structure, the relations between signs have no 
meaning. The underlying binary oppositions within a given text thus become 
explanatory devices to the structuralist, which means that everything – including 
our ‘reality’- can only ever be understood through linguistic structures whose 
meaning is determined in accordance with cultural conventions rather than 
empirical factuality (113). 
 
Secondly, and contrary to Saussure’s notion, Derrida does not view the signifier 
and the signified “simply as the two faces of one and the same leaf” (Derrida 
1997:11). To Derrida, they are never easily united. Instead, the movement of 
signification opens up to a state of endless deferral (“deferring”) in which 
meaning is always marked by a sense of undecidability because it is continuously 
deferred; it is never fully present but contains within itself a trace or mark of 
                                                 
8 Although Ferdinand de Saussure died in 1913, his influential Course in General Linguistics was 
published in 1916; a text based on the notes of his students. In this book, Saussure perceives only 
the acoustic image as being a signifier, not the written word, which is why Derrida considers 
Saussure a logocentrist. 
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absence; otherness. We can never reach a sense of stable and absolute meaning 
because there is no such thing as a final signified (absolute presence of meaning). 
From the moment that a given sign ‘enters the game’ or ‘movement’ of 
signification, its signifier is transformed into a signified, this signified in turn is 
modified into yet another signifier, which again becomes a new signified, and so 
on. Hence, the sign is always slippery which means that if we accept Derrida’s 
claim that “[f]rom the moment that there is meaning there are nothing but signs” 
(50)9, this assumption inevitably has some serious consequences as regards the 
traditional logocentric concept of meaning. If meaning can somewhat be equalled 
with signs, then meaning too remains forever unstable and on the move, never 
fully present in itself. 
 
3.2.1 Textual ‘reality’: foregrounding the signifier 
Since the arrival of the signified is endlessly postponed, the signifier itself 
becomes foregrounded. With Derrida’s concept of differance, there is thus a very 
strong notion of textuality. Everything is subsumed by language which leads us to 
another famous, and equally notorious, claim by Derrida, namely “there is nothing 
outside the text” (163)10. This statement has often been misinterpreted and, 
consequently, Derrida has been accused of denying the existence of an empirical 
world. Derrida does not dispute that there is such thing as a solid world but he 
does undermine the conventional assumption that a distinction between ‘the 
world’ and ‘the text’ can actually be made. To Derrida, we cannot speak of 
anything that precedes language, be it solid objects, human constructs, events, etc. 
Nothing makes sense to us outside of sign systems; outside of text. In such view, 
everything is essentially conceived as text and, as a result, we only have access to 
‘reality’ in its mediated form. However, the discourses we produce do not reflect 
the world, but instead they construct, and even contaminate, our ‘reality’. Hence, 
Derrida rejects the traditional notion of mimesis: that language is capable of 
describing and representing accurately a pre-existing world or meaning that makes 
                                                 
9 This clearly echoes Saussure’s notion that “Without language, thought is a vague, uncharted 
nebula” (Saussure 1974:112). 
10 Others, such as Mark Currie, have translated Derrida’s “‘Il n’y a pas de-hors texte’” into English 
in the following way, “‘There is no outside-text’” (Currie 1998:45). 
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sense to us externally to a given sign system. Rather, mimesis in Derrida’s view 
foregrounds the textuality of ‘reality’ as it hinges on a given text’s mimetic 
relationship to other texts, i.e., intertextual references. In the light of the above, it 
would seem somewhat impossible to actually determine what really constitutes 
the solid world since Derrida’s theory seems to imply a conflation of ‘reality’ and 
its (attempted) representation. Put differently, the ‘reality’ we perceive through 
our senses is never the thing itself, but always only a representation of that very 
thing, always mediated and never void of interpretation. It would therefore be 
absolutely pertinent to consider ontological issues such as, how or even if we can 
ever know ‘reality’. 
 
3.3 Barthes’ textual practice 
Roland Barthes has himself been a key figure in terms of articulating the basic 
principles of structuralism, but later on in his career, he grew increasingly more 
(self-)critical of the structuralist orthodox. This transition is reflected in the later 
writings of Barthes which are of particular interest to us here. Because of the 
development that is traceable in Barthes’ proposed ideas, he is often considered 
crucial in terms of the shift from structuralism to poststructuralism. One of the 
main points of Barthes’ later texts, in which we find a general agreement with 
many of Derrida’s points (established above), is the collapse of the traditionally 
distinct labours of criticism and literature, which is often manifested in 
postmodern metafiction by its tendency to incorporate its own analysis. In the 
following, I want to examine Barthes’ reconceptualisation of the text, our 
approach to it, as well as the author, which are all crucial to this thesis. 
 
In “Theory of The Text” (1973), Barthes disputes the conventional perception of 
the text as “an object, submitted to the distant inspection of a knowing subject” 
(Barthes in Young, 1981: 35) who can derive from it a single and stable meaning; 
a view held dear by structuralism. Instead, Barthes urges us to rethink the text as 
“productivity” (36); a locus for the ongoing production of significance. 
Undoubtedly, the signifiers of a written text remain fixed (the printed words on 
the page cannot be altered), however, the multiple and potential meanings – or 
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readings - of the text are not rigid or definite. These come into existence at the 
moment that “the scriptor and/or the reader begin to play with the signifier” (37). 
Thus, Barthes suggests that the text be viewed as “the very theatre of a production 
where the producer and reader of the text meet: the text ‘works’, at each moment 
and from whatever side one takes it” (36). The kind of textual interaction that 
Barthes proposes always emphasises notions of play, pleasure, imagination, and 
seduction: the sense of plunging into (or giving into) the text and letting oneself 
be lost in the indefinite and unpredictable play of language. Barthes refers to this 
as “the concept of ‘signifiance’” (38) through which a state of erotic bliss can be 
reached, “whence its identification with ‘jouissance’” (38). 
 
This very notion of signifiance - the constant movement and openness of the text - 
that Barthes proposes has serious implications for two of structuralism’s most 
basic and closely related assumptions: the concept of a transparent metalanguage 
and the idea of an objective stance from where a given object-text can be 
scientifically explained and arrested. Barthes argues that, 
 
The language we decide to use to define the text is not a matter of 
indifference, for it is part of the theory of the text to plunge any enunciation, 
including its own, into crisis. The theory of the text is directly critical of any 
metalanguage: revising the discourse of scientificity, it demands a mutation 
in science itself, since the human sciences have hitherto never called into 
question their own language, which they have considered as a mere 
instrument or as purely transparent. The text is a fragment of language, 
itself placed in a perspective of languages. To communicate some 
knowledge or some theoretical reflection about the text pre-supposes, then, 
that one is oneself in some way or other engaging in textual practice (35). 
 
 
What Barthes is effectively doing, is declaring the end of traditional literary 
criticism “as a discourse held ‘on’ a work” (44) by implying that the language of 
the critic is no different from that of the text he is attempting to describe. Put 
differently, the language of fiction (the object) and the language of criticism (the 
instrument) work according to the same principles and operate in similar ways, 
and the latter does not ensure the presence of a final signified. The referentiality 
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of metalanguage cannot be considered any different from that of the literary text. 
From the moment that the critic tries to make sense of a text, he is in fact 
dependent upon and unable to step outside the very language system that he is 
attempting to describe from an assumed external position. What Barthes proposes 
is a self-reflexive method of approaching the text which he refers to as “textual 
analysis” (43). Textual analysis delights in the idea of pluralism and “impugns the 
idea of a final signified […by] entering into the play of signifiers” (43); knowing 
fully well that any other assumption would be deceptive. Barthes’ notion of 
textual analysis radically dissociates itself from the doctrine of structuralism 
which “seeks in general to discover the meaning of the work” (my emphasis, 43) 
by revealing its assumed underlying and universal structures, and thus bring to the 
text a sense of closeness. Contrary to this notion, textual analysis upholds the idea 
of pluralism (although, paradoxically, such view is itself monistic) and is careful 
not to transmute or in other ways ‘shape’ a given text by imposing structures onto 
it. Instead, Barthes claims in “From Work to Text” (1971),  
 
[T]he discourse on the Text should itself be nothing other than text, 
research, textual activity, since the Text is that social space which leaves no 
language safe, outside, nor any subject of the enunciation in position as 
judge, master, analyst, confessor, decoder. The theory of the Text can 
coincide only with a practice of writing (emphasis original, Barthes 
1977:164). 
 
 
Any commentary ‘on’ a given text becomes itself a textual practice; it cannot be 
anything but a text - in the Barthesian sense, of course, as established above: it is 
productivity. Hence, it corresponds to what Barthes calls “a practice of writing” 
which strongly implies the ongoing process of meaning-making that the play of 
language inevitably entails: text is being produced or written as soon as one 
engages in textual practice which in turn amounts to a text itself. The text is 
practice and practice is the text! Or put differently, the narrative is its own critical 
reading and its critical reading is the narrative. This inevitably means that the 
border between literary and critical writing somewhat ceases to exist; the two 
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labours can no longer be considered overtly distinct. This is clearly manifested in 
metafictional practices, as we shall see. 
 
3.3.1 “The Death of the Author” 
Barthes’ thorough reworking does not stop at the text and our approach to it. The 
author as we have conceived him thus far is also subject to Barthes’ 
reconceptualisation. In Barthes’ essay “The Death of the Author” (1968), we find 
what is generally considered one of his most notorious assertions, as he here 
boldly declares the author dead. To Barthes, “writing is the destruction of every 
voice, of every point of origin” (142) which means that as soon as there is writing, 
“the author enters into his own death” (142). What Barthes is declaring dead - or 
outdated – is not the actual human being made out of flesh and blood who has put 
pen to paper and written a text. Instead, Barthes is concerned with the concept of 
the author as a subject with a particular function that is socially and historically 
constructed, and the importance generally assigned to this subject in terms of how 
we understand his work (142-3). That is, Barthes disputes the more conventional 
critical approach in which, 
 
The explanation of a work is always sought in the man or woman who 
produced it, as if it were always in the end, through the more or less 
transparent allegory of the fiction, the voice of a single person, the author 
‘confiding’ in us (emphasis original, 143). 
 
 
We cannot look to the author in order to make sense of, or bring closure to, the 
text since the author does not possess any special powers that enable him to 
control or arrest the movement of language (hence the traditional perception of the 
author as God-like). Rather, “it is language which speaks, not the author; to write 
is, through a prerequisite impersonality […], to reach that point where only 
language acts, ‘performs’, and not ‘me’” (143). What Barthes seems to imply is 
the notion that it is actually language, or writing, that creates the author and not 
the other way around; the author does not pre-exist his work. Nor is he capable of 
transmitting through language a pre-existing meaning (or origin), because this 
meaning too exists to the author himself only in language as “a ready-formed 
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dictionary, its words only explainable through other words, and so on 
indefinitely” (146). Thus, in Barthes’ work, as with Derrida, we find a strong 
emphasis on textuality: all that a writer can ever hope to do is “to mix writings, to 
counter the ones with the others, in such a way as never to rest on any of them” 
(146). Writing to Barthes then does not mirror anything external to it but rather it 
becomes an activity that always occurs at the very moment that the act of reading 
takes place. Hence, “there is no other time than that of the enunciation and every 
text is eternally written here and now” (emphasis original, 145). Barthes, in other 
words, shifts the traditional focus on the author to that of the reader who is now 
perceived as an active and crucial (co-)producer or writer of the text, 
 
Thus is revealed the total existence of writing: a text is made of multiple 
writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relations of 
dialogue, parody, contestation, but there is one place where this multiplicity 
is focused and that place is the reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author. 
The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing 
are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its 
origin but in its destination (148). 
 
 
The unity of the text is no longer to be sought in the author as its originator or 
centre, but instead in its reception: the reader – as a concept upon whom writing is 
inscribed. The possible intentions of the author are irrelevant in terms of how the 
text is perceived by its reader who is now overtly recognised as an active producer 
of the text he is reading, and who is held responsible for the text’s ‘decoding’. 
Writing and reading are therefore seen as somewhat parallel processes to Barthes. 
The text is not a ‘finished product’ that functions as a transparent glass through 
which some meaning can easily be recognised and passively consumed by the 
reader11. Hence, Barthes urges us “to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader 
must be at the cost of the death of the Author” (148). 
 
Thus, poststructuralism, as we have seen, is explicitly preoccupied with 
interrogating and undermining conventional notions of fixed structures and 
                                                 
11 Cf. Federman’s term “pre-text”, which he uses to designate the process of writing since the text 
is never completed until the active involvement of the reader has begun (Federman 1993:50). 
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referentiality by exposing and destabilising the very linguistic systems that render 
such notions significant to us. Most importantly we established Derrida’s view on 
the relationship between the signifier and the signified, which he perceives as 
unstable and forever on the move. The endless process of signification, generated 
through difference and continuous deferral, is thus brought to the fore, resulting in 
the inability of the signified to ever become stable, or transcendental. To Derrida, 
nothing makes sense to us outside of text, hence signs make up the world we have 
access to through our senses. Consequently, ‘reality’ is always already imbued 
with interpretation, always already a discursive representation. Investigating 
Barthes’ work, we established his revolutionary approach to the text, which 
delights in pluralism and the slippery nature of language. Exposing the idea of 
scientificity as delusory, Barthes’ declares the end of traditional literary criticism, 
emphasising instead the critic’s inability to ever occupy an extra-linguistic 
position – critical and literary writing can therefore no longer be considered 
distinct labours. Stressing the nature of language as performative and opaque, the 
traditional God-like role of the author is subverted and instead the reader is now 
acknowledged as an active participant in the production of text and significance. 
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4.0 The metafictional novel 
4.1 Towards a definition of metafiction 
Having established a general idea of what the term postmodernism denotes, its 
socio-historical context, and also the self-reflexive mode of poststructuralist 
criticism, we will now turn our attention to the metafictional novel. In this section, 
I will first of all attempt to reach a general definition of the concept of 
metafiction. Secondly, I want to establish some of the narrative techniques 
employed in such writing, and for this purpose I will be drawing extensively on 
the works of Waugh and McHale. 
 
In Metafiction. The Theory and Practice of Self-Conscious Fiction (1984), Patricia 
Waugh defines the concept of ‘metafiction’ in its most basic form as,  
 
[F]ictional writing which self-consciously and systematically draws 
attention to its status as an artefact in order to pose questions about the 
relationship between fiction and reality (Waugh 2001:2). 
 
 
We are, in other words, dealing with a type of fiction that is acutely aware of its 
own status as a fictional construct while, at the same time, it also deliberately 
flaunts the fact that it knows it exists as an artefact. By calling attention to its own 
nature as a linguistic construct, metafiction does not attempt to create the illusion 
that it is ‘real life’ (as, for instance, traditional realism does). Instead, metafiction 
reveals itself as art by flaunting its own status as a representation of the 
representable. Metafiction often deliberately attempts to blur and break down the 
traditional distinction between the extra-linguistic world and the textual realm of 
the novel and, in doing so, it both highlights and renders problematic issues 
concerning representation and construction. This type of writing therefore 
displays a critical attitude towards the conventions and assumptions of fiction that 
we have somewhat come to take for granted and, frequently, metafictional writers 
set out to explore the world-text relationship by subverting and experimenting 
with literary conventions that are familiar to us. Metafiction thus examines its 
own relationship (as a piece of fiction) to the empirical world and, consequently, 
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it reminds us that fiction as well as ‘reality’ exist to us only as textual and illusory 
constructs. ‘Reality’ is, in other words, turned into a highly questionable and 
relative concept. Indeed, ‘the world of fiction’ versus ‘the solid world’ is a 
problematic relationship that metafictional writing often takes as its subject-
matter. 
 
If we accept that metafiction is conscious of its own identity as fiction (and even 
flaunts this awareness), this type of writing must also, effectively and to some 
extent, be considered theoretical. Metafiction is thus a borderline discourse - a 
hybrid of literature and criticism, which clearly concurs with the ideas proposed 
by Barthes in section 3.3. In Mark Currie’s view, metafictional writing “is a way 
of giving the novel a critical function, the ability to explore the logic and the 
philosophy of narrative without recourse to metalanguage” (Currie 1998:52). 
Waugh too emphasises the theoretical aspect of metafiction which, to her, is 
manifested in its attempt to “explore a theory of fiction through the practice of 
writing fiction” (emphasis original, Waugh 2001:2). Finally, Hutcheon refers to 
metafiction as “fiction about fiction – that is, fiction that includes within itself a 
commentary on its own narrative and/or linguistic identity” (Hutcheon 1991:1). 
All the above definitions hinge on a paradox that points to the twofold function of 
metafictional writing. On the one hand, the metafictional novel continues to fulfil 
the criteria of the traditional novel by presenting us with a story; i.e., by projecting 
a fictional world. On the other hand, and at the same time, it also makes a 
statement about its own status as fiction and, consequently, undermines the 
fictional illusion it has just created. Metafiction therefore is also about ‘aboutness’ 
– about its nature as fiction and the literary conventions employed in its making. It 
incorporates critical discourse(s) into its fictional frame(s) and can therefore be 
considered a locus for theoretical and artistic imbrications. 
 
Defining metafiction as writing that is ‘self-conscious’, however, seems to 
indicate a type of writing that is entirely introverted and (seemingly) always only 
about itself as fiction; not writing that also includes within itself a dimension 
concerning its own ‘aboutness’. This problematic issue, Currie addresses 
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specifically in his introduction to Metafiction (1995). Although Currie too 
considers metafiction a borderline discourse, he argues that if metafictional 
writing is conscious of its own nature as fiction, it is simply not enough for it to 
know that it is fiction – it must also be conscious of its own existence as 
metafiction “if its self-knowledge is adequate, and so on in an infinite logical 
regress” (Currie 2001:1). Hence, Currie prefers to use the term “‘theoretical 
fiction’” (Currie 1998:52) rather than ‘self-conscious fiction’12. It is remarkable 
that Waugh does not pick up on this particular aspect of ‘self-consciousness’ in 
her comprehensive study of metafiction; especially in light of her comment below 
regarding ‘consciousness’ in relation to Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. 
Here, Waugh argues that, 
 
acts of consciousness have to be conscious of themselves, so that even 
when consciousness is focused on something else – when writing, for 
example - it must remain aware of itself on the edges of consciousness or 
the subject cannot continue to write (Waugh 2001:27). 
 
 
It would thus seem evident that if a piece of fiction is defined in terms of its self-
consciousness, it must also be (self-)conscious of its own self-consciousness, and 
so forth. Put differently, it is not sufficient for metafictional writing to know that it 
exists as fiction; it must also know that it is fiction that knows it is fiction, etc. 
 
4.2 Postmodern metafiction 
Although the use of metafictional devices in prose fiction is generally considered 
a distinctive feature of postmodernism, this does not mean that all contemporary 
fiction falls under the heading of metafiction. Nor does it mean that earlier works 
cannot be seen as displaying a number of metafictional elements13. In fact, 
metafiction is by no means a new phenomenon but rather, as Hutcheon argues, it 
is “part of a long novelistic tradition”, and the one thing that makes it particularly 
pertinent today “is only its degree of internalized self-consciousness about what 
                                                 
12 For the sake of simplicity, however, I shall continue to employ the term ‘metafiction’ throughout 
this thesis – even if such term does carry with it certain implications. 
13 An often cited example in this context is Laurence Sterne’s The Life and Opinions of Tristram 
Shandy, Gentleman which was first published in the years 1759-67. 
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are, in fact, realities of reading all literature” (emphasis original, Hutcheon 
1991:xvii). Waugh too argues that metafictionality is the essence of all fiction, 
and adds that it has become especially noticeable in literary practices since the 
1960s due to a general inclination amongst writers to display a high(er) awareness 
“of the theoretical issues involved in constructing fictions” (Waugh 2001:2). 
Metafictionality thus remains an inherent and constitutive part of all literature. 
Today, however, there seems to be a greater awareness of the procedures and 
techniques involved in the act of fiction-making, which contemporary writers are 
making a conscious effort to make explicit. As we have already established in 
chapter 2.0, postmodernism is predominantly concerned with destabilising and 
rendering fictional orthodoxies and verities that have conventionally served as 
groundings for our modes of understanding the world. Nevertheless, we cannot 
simply use metafictionality as synonymous with postmodernism. Instead we 
might tentatively propose that it is a question of degree, and I will argue that 
within the postmodern context, a very high degree of overt metafictionality is 
indeed discernable. Thus, postmodern metafictional writing is generally 
characterised or, perhaps rather, dominated by an explicit and deliberate attempt 
to flaunt the very methods, strategies and conventions entailed in any construction 
of fiction. It strives towards calling attention to its own existence as fiction, as 
well as its place within literary history, which adds to it a highly intertextual 
dimension. In this relation, Currie once again finds the term ‘self-conscious’ 
inappropriate since “[n]ovels which reflect upon themselves in the postmodern 
age act in a sense as commentaries on their antecedents” (Currie 2001:1). This 
type of fiction, in other words, is not meaningfully ‘self’ conscious because it 
“refers to fictions other than itself, in its own history” (1). Postmodern metafiction 
is both aware of and (re-)uses conventions characteristic of previous and well-
established modes of literature. Literary realism and the assumptions upon which 
this mode relies are often consciously subverted and mocked by postmodern 
metafictionists, and Federman is no exception as his writing challenges and 
openly breaks with this tradition. In many cases, the familiar conventions of 
realism constitute a background against which metafictional practices can be 
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recognised and comprehended by the reader. This is a point that both Waugh and 
Hutcheon make and it is something to which I shall return below. 
 
4.3 The ontological status of fiction and the role of the reader 
Hutcheon claims that “in all fiction, language is representational, but of a fictional 
“other” world, a complete and coherent “heterocosm” created by the fictive 
referents of the signs” (Hutcheon 1991:7). If the above assertion applies to all 
fiction, and is particularly foregrounded in metafiction, it will be necessary for us 
to investigate this aspect of literature in some detail. It will therefore be essential 
for us to establish exactly how a “heterocosm” is created and sustained. McHale’s 
Postmodernist Fiction is highly relevant for this purpose since we will be dealing 
with ontology and the idea of ‘possible worlds’. Although we have already 
touched upon the concept of ontology in the section on postmodernism, we need 
to investigate this specifically in relation to (all) literature to which it is central. 
Establishing what these terms denominate will not only teach us something about 
the nature of all literature. In addition, they are paramount in order for us to fully 
understand the way in which metafictional techniques work as a means of 
exposing the linguistic basis for fiction-making. Indeed, both ontology and 
possible worlds are concepts with which numerous metafictional writers 
experiment, particularly Federman as we shall see. 
  
In McHale’s view, ontology is the practice of giving  
 
a description of a universe, not of the universe; that is, it may describe any 
universe, potentially a plurality of universes. In other words, to “do” 
ontology in this perspective is not necessarily to seek some grounding for 
our universe; it might just as appropriately involve describing other 
universes, including “possible” or even “impossible” universes – not least 
of all the other universe, or heterocosm, of fiction (emphasis original, 
McHale 1999:27). 
 
 
From this it is clear that ontology denotes the practice of giving an account of 
a(ny) universe, or world, whether this world is considered “possible” or 
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“impossible” in terms of what we are able to conclude from our everyday logic. 
That is, the kind of ontology that McHale proposes is not based on whether its 
truth-value can be verified according to some factual statement in the empirical 
world. Thus, the logic and plausibility of a given fictional heterocosm should not 
be determined in accordance with anything external to it. An alternative world is 
made out of statements and as such its truth-value must be considered only within 
the textual realm that these statements constitute14. McHale’s definition also 
makes explicit that the existence of more than one world is indeed possible, which 
is important in relation to metafiction since such writing often experiments with 
and flaunts this idea. But it is not enough to simply describe imaginative 
universes. In order for these worlds to be plausible, “they must be believed in, 
imagined, wished for etc., by some human agent” (34). Hence, their existence 
depends upon the reader’s attitude and it is the reader who concretises – or makes 
possible – these (im)possible worlds during the act of reading. It would seem, 
then, that it is in fact possible even for an ‘impossible’ world to exist within that 
other realm we refer to as fiction. In a manner of speaking, then, anything is 
possible within the aesthetic realm as long as the reader is capable of and willing 
to suspend his disbelief at all times during the reading process. The fictional world 
thus comes into being in the reader’s consciousness, and the only limitations in 
terms of how broad and abstract this universe may be are the reader’s imagination 
and attitude. 
 
4.4 The creation/description paradox: to describe is to create is to describe 
From the above we are able to conclude that fictional worlds exist to us only in 
our consciousness and are triggered off by the printed words on the page. Indeed, 
the materiality of the words of the page is something that we cannot ignore when 
studying the more radical types of metafiction as this aspect is often deliberately 
emphasised in such texts (this I shall return to later on). Together these two 
aspects of literature amount to a particular paradox, which Waugh refers to as “the 
                                                 
14 Hutcheon seemingly agrees when she claims that the words that make up a narrative “take on a 
unity of reference and create a self-contained universe that is its own validity (and “truth”)” 
(Hutcheon, 1991:88). 
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creation/description paradox” (emphasis original, Waugh 2001:88). Although this 
paradox is in fact a defining feature of all literature, it is often overtly 
foregrounded in metafiction. The creation/description paradox is closely related to 
the concept of ontology as examined above, but it also has to do with the twofold 
manner in which novelistic language generally works. According to Waugh, 
 
Descriptions of objects in fiction are simultaneously creations of that 
object. […] Thus the ontological status of fictional objects is determined by 
the fact that they exist by virtue of, whilst also forming, the fictional context 
which is finally the words on the page (emphasis original, 88). 
 
 
Put differently, this means that to produce a statement in literary writing is to 
produce fictional existents, be it characters, objects, or settings. Yet no matter how 
equivalent to, or interchangeable with, the empirical world such narrative 
fabrication may appear to be in our view, its presented world with its existents 
remains a verbal construction. Such fictional creations have no existence in the 
real solid world but are only ‘present’ within the sphere of language at the 
moment when their existence is furnished by the active involvement of the reader. 
In other words, these objects have only fictive referents and it is crucial that they 
be read as such; not as solid objects. They may of course be anchored in the ‘real’ 
world, but they do not exist as tangible entities in such phenomenal world. Using 
the terminology of the Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden, McHale makes a 
similar point when he claims that the status of fictional objects has to do with 
‘indeterminacies’. McHale states that “[r]eal-world objects have no indeterminate 
points, ontologically speaking [...], while presented objects in fiction have 
ontological gaps” (emphasis original, McHale 1999:31), of which only some can 
be filled in by the reader. From this it follows that unlike extra-textual objects in 
the solid world, imaginative objects/worlds exist to us only on the level of 
language and as such they are “always uncertainly awaiting completion” (Waugh 
2001:105). In addition, they may potentially be constructed in an indefinite 
number of ways since no reader is the same. Each individual reader brings 
something different to the text; or to the imaginative world he is concretising. 
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4.5 Narrative techniques in metafictional writing 
Having established a general idea of what the term metafiction denotes, we need 
to turn our attention to some of the narrative strategies often employed in such 
writing. In the following, therefore, I want to examine some of the techniques that 
metafictional writers make use of. This section will primarily be based on ideas 
proposed by Waugh and McHale, as I feel that a combination of the two will 
allow me to establish a set of analytical tools highly suitable for analysing 
Federman’s novels. While the poetics of Waugh and McHale at times overlap, a 
combination of the two is nevertheless useful for elaborating and adding 
perspective to many of the points they make. Both critics argue that the idea of 
frame-breaking is particularly characteristic of metafictional practices, and 
Federman is one writer who pushes frame-breaking strategies to their extreme, as 
we shall see later on. When we move onto examining the concept of 
‘historiographic metafiction’ in the forthcoming section, it will also be evident 
that the concept of frame-breaking is central, particularly as regards the traditional 
demarcation between the realm of fact and the realm of fiction. The concept of 
frame-breaking is thus the common denominator for the metafictional techniques 
below. 
 
It is also worth mentioning that in Metafiction. The Theory and Practice of Self-
Conscious Fiction, Waugh proposes a spectrum consisting of four degrees of 
metafictionality in which texts gradually move further and further away from an 
everyday context and, consequently, become increasingly self-referential. The 
first two types of metafiction can somewhat be referred to as ‘non-radical’, 
however, our focus will be on the latter end of her sliding scale where we find 
much more radical forms of metafictional writing. These more extreme forms, 
Waugh reluctantly argues, are primarily an American phenomenon (115). 
Furthermore, it should be added that a clear-cut distinction between the four 
proposed categories cannot easily be made. Although Waugh refrains from 
making this explicit, her categories do overlap at times and should perhaps 
therefore be seen only as guidelines for determining and dealing with different 
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degrees of metafictionality, rather than a rigid system of classification15. Thus, as 
a rule of thumb, it can be said that the strategies established below pertain to 
Waugh’s spectrum at a point where texts generally tend to “slip further and 
further away from the construction of worlds whose ‘meaning’ is finally 
dependent on reference to everyday contexts” (130). Moving gradually away from 
an interpretive framework that relies on the common-sensical, stronger demands 
are made on the reader’s ability and willingness to suspend his disbelief when 
reading such text.  
 
4.6 Breaking the frame: a metafictional strategy 
It goes almost without saying that in order for any frame-breaking activities to 
take place, there must be some sort of ‘frame’ that can be broken or undermined. 
Frame-breaking thus presupposes that a sense of frame – a structure supporting or 
containing something – has already been established. The use of frames, Waugh 
argues, is extensive because it is something that we all make use of on a daily 
basis, even if we do not give it much thought. “Everything is framed”, she 
maintains, “whether in life or in novels” (28), and in ‘reality’, frames work as a 
way for us to try to structure and make sense of our experiences (30). As regards 
fiction, the idea of frames “involves [the] analysis of formal conventional 
organization of novels” (30). Frames are thus essential in terms of how we 
understand and organise our own everyday life, or ‘reality’, as well as the 
imaginary worlds of literature. The idea of frames is paramount for the existence 
of possible worlds since each of these ontological levels is based on the principle 
of being built around, or constructed upon, a framework that sets it apart from 
other possible realms. Metafictional novels not only call attention to the way in 
which we generally make use of frames. In addition, such novels often overtly 
problematise the usage of this concept by questioning what constitutes a frame 
and also how, or even if, any frame is capable of separating the world of fiction 
from ‘reality’ (28). 
                                                 
15 Through her analysis of Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five, for example, Waugh implicitly 
illustrates how one text may be seen to display elements that pertain to more than one of the 
categories she presents (Waugh 2001:127-9 and 131).  
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4.6.1 Mingling with the characters: the author as a fictional construct 
There are numerous ways in which the idea of frames can be questioned and 
undermined in fiction. Each works as a way of foregrounding the way in which a 
fictional heterocosm is structured and, consequently, exposes what can probably 
be considered one of the most basic principles of all fiction-making. One way of 
doing this is by introducing the author into the fictional sphere he has just created. 
“The author”, McHale claims, “occupies an ontological level superior to his 
[fictional] world; [and] by breaking the frame around [t]his world, the author 
foregrounds his own superior reality” (McHale 1999:197). In other words, by 
writing himself into the fictional universe, the author calls attention to the fact that 
the ‘reality’ of his very own fiction is an illusion created by him. This strategy 
therefore functions as a clear admission on behalf of the author that he is telling a 
story, which naturally emphasises his authority and power as creator of a given 
textual universe. In addition, and rather than “abolishing the frame, this gesture 
merely widens it to include the author as a fictional character” (emphasis original, 
198). Hence, this frame-breaking technique not only affects the status of the 
projected ‘reality’ within the fiction, but it also carries with it some serious 
implications as regards the identity of the author himself. As soon as an author 
penetrates his own narrative, he too becomes a fictional construct. That is, he too 
exists within the textual realm, thus making his existence equal to that of his 
fictional characters. Waugh maintains that such instances present the reader with a 
paradox: “The more the author appears, the less he or she exists. The more the 
author flaunts his or her presence in the novel, the more noticeable is his or her 
absence outside it” (emphasis original, Waugh 2001:134). McHale refers to this 
as a “short-circuit of the ontological structure” (McHale 1999:213) and asserts 
that such strategy is in fact only ever hypothetically possible. It does not really 
take place but the text merely pretends that it does (thus we have an instance of 
‘trompe-l’oeil’, cf. section 4.6.4). To Waugh, however, this evidently means that 
once the author “is recognized as itself a construction produced through textual 
relationships, then worlds, texts and authors are subsumed by language” (Waugh 
2001:130). This idea not only applies to the ‘Real Author’ but certainly also to 
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any given narrator or author regardless of his position(s) within the narrative 
hierarchy. 
 
4.6.2 Intrusive commentary: multiple and competing voices 
The use of intrusive commentary is another device that foregrounds the different 
ontological levels of a text. However, Waugh warns us that this strategy is fully 
dependent on its intended effect. For example, the usage of intrusive commentary 
in 19th century realist fiction cannot be considered a metafictional strategy simply 
because it does not attempt to purposely uncover the frame between two 
ontologically distinct levels. Rather, it aims at the complete opposite by proposing 
“that one is a continuation of the other” (32). In light of the above definition of the 
metafictional novel, it is evident that in order for this technique to work in favour 
of self-conscious literature, it must emphasise and flaunt the idea that fictional 
characters and their author pertain to different realities. Thus, in “metafictional 
texts such intrusions expose the ontological distinctness of the real and the 
fictional world, expose the literary conventions that disguise this distinctness” 
(emphasis original, 32). An instance of intrusive commentary that works in a self-
reflexive manner could be the author’s discussion of the literary conventions 
employed, or perhaps a direct comment on how we should interpret a previous 
segment of text. While such techniques may not exactly break the frame, they 
certainly foreground the fact that the teller is situated on a plane that differs 
ontologically from the ‘reality’ (within the fiction) that he both comments on and 
creates. Much more extreme instances of intrusive commentary are discernable in 
what Waugh calls “third-person/first-person intrusion narratives […in which] an 
apparently autonomous world is suddenly broken into by a narrator, often ‘The 
Author’, who comes explicitly from an ontologically differentiated world” (133). 
Such violation of the narrative order and its consequences for the author’s 
identity, we have already dealt with above. However, it is worth mentioning here 
that such an act of intruding mostly generates a sense of dialogue, or even 
competition, between the discourses (or levels) of the story and that of the 
intrusive narrator. This brings us on to one of Mikhail Bakhtin’s ideas, namely 
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that the novel always consists of numerous different discourses, or voices, that are 
competing for power and dominance. Or, as Waugh puts it, 
 
The novel assimilates a variety of discourses (representations of speech, 
forms of narrative) – discourses that always to some extent question and 
relativize each other’s authority. Realism [...] paradoxically functions by 
suppressing this dialogue. The conflict of languages and voices is 
apparently resolved in realist fiction through their subordination to the 
dominant ‘voice’ of the omniscient, godlike author. Novels which Bakhtin 
refers to as ‘dialogic’ resist such resolution (emphasis original, 6). 
 
 
 
In Bakhtinian terms then, the metafictional novel can be considered ‘dialogic’ 
because, unlike realism, it deliberately refrains from offering any sense of 
resolution to the conflicting discourses that constitute it. On the contrary, 
metafiction flaunts and delights in the fact that such resolution, or closure, is not 
possible and, consequently, it reminds us that it is constructed by multiple and 
diverse forms of communication and ontologically differentiated levels.  
  
In the midst of all these frame-breaking strategies, it is of course relevant to ask: 
where does one draw the line? Can we ever be sure that there is not always a 
‘reality’ (or frame) superior to the one we have just been presented with? Waugh 
claims that “[t]here is ultimately no distinction between ‘framed’ and ‘unframed’. 
There are only levels of form” (31). Many metafictional novels play with this idea 
by deliberately generating a sense of limitless descent, or ascent, through layers of 
stories. Naturally, such radical frame-breaking activities often have disturbing and 
unsettling effects on the reader because it becomes increasingly harder for him to 
conclude anything for sure, let alone make use of his everyday sense of logic in 
terms of interpreting the text at hand. In the following, I want to examine 
metafictional techniques that seriously challenge and destabilise our notion of 
frames. 
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4.6.3 Stories within stories 
‘Stories within stories’ is a technique that falls under the heading of what McHale 
calls “Chinese-box worlds” and is based on the formula of a “recursive structure” 
(McHale 1999:112). A recursive structure can be said to occur whenever the same 
operation is repeated, however, “each time operating on the product of the 
previous operation” (112). Take for example a novel that projects its own world 
within which we find a character who writes a novel that also projects a fictional 
world in which yet another character writes a novel, etc. Hence, a recursive 
structure is characterised by nested or embedded narratives: gradually a 
hierarchical system of narratives is created, and each time we are presented with 
yet another fictional world, it involves an ontological level incompatible with the 
‘world’ from which the fictional world in question is projected. The structures of 
Chinese-box worlds, Waugh argues, “contest the reality of each individual ‘box’ 
through a nesting of narrators” (Waugh 2001:30). Evidently, such verbal 
constructions can take on very complex and illogical forms. Therefore, it will be 
fruitful for us to establish a systematic overview that will enable us (to try) to 
keep track of and also deal with the (often numerous) different narrative levels 
that may occur within a metafictional text. Borrowing from Gérard Genette, 
McHale proposes the following terminology to this practice, 
 
Diegesis: designates the “primary world” projected by a given text 
 
Hypodiegetic world: designates a projected world within (and thus one level down 
from) the primary world, or diegesis. 
 
Hypo-hypodiegetic world: designates a projected world within the hypodiegetic 
world, etc. Each additional prefixed ‘hypo’ indicates that we move one level 
further down the system of embedded narratives 
(McHale 1999:113). 
 
 
There are, nevertheless, a few pertinent issues that we need to address. Firstly, at 
what point can the accumulation of nested stories be said to generate the feeling of 
infinite regress? Secondly, is it possible to take this idea to a point where it 
(intentionally) becomes too intricate and, consequently, causes the whole structure 
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to collapse? McHale maintains that the notion of infinite regress is not necessarily 
linked to the quantity of nested narratives within the text, but rather “the vigor and 
explicitness of its foregrounding” (114). He adds that in “postmodernist multilevel 
texts” we often encounter “complexity increasing to the point where levels 
collapse, as if of their own weight, into a single level of diegesis” (115). From this 
we can conclude that a text need not necessarily consist of a vast number of 
embedded stories in order for it to invoke the notion of infinite regress. Instead, 
the effect achieved depends upon the way in which the recursive structure is 
brought to the fore. Furthermore, by establishing a hierarchy of ontological levels 
that is too complex, the system caves in and, in doing so, calls attention to the 
many possible (albeit fictional) dimensions of a given fictional heterocosm. 
 
4.6.4 Trompe-l’oeil: appearances can deceive 
The above techniques imply an explicit attempt to foreground and expose the idea 
of a recursive structure. Metafictional texts do not always do this overtly. For 
example, the technique referred to as “[t]rompe-l’oeil”16 (115) is based on the 
principle of deliberately misleading the reader into thinking that a given presented 
object or world is actually ‘real’ within the fictional context. For example, the text 
may deliberately blur the borders between different imaginary worlds and, thus, 
disorient the reader who in a state of confusion often ends up perceiving “an 
embedded, secondary world as the primary, diegetic world” (115). The sense of a 
logical and hierarchical ordering of ontological levels within the text is thus 
intentionally presented as unclear and hazy; an effect that is only achieved if the 
reader realises that he has been deceived. Ironically, such an attempt at fusing 
narrative levels by disguising the fact that they pertain to planes that differ 
ontologically, actually foregrounds the ontological structure of the text. Though 
such a technique tries to mask the act of frame-breaking, it nevertheless both calls 
attention to and breaks the frame(s). As we saw above, it also includes the idea of 
the author penetrating his own fictional world by writing himself into this world.  
 
                                                 
16 In English this means ‘eye-deceiving’. 
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Effectively, we could of course argue that as soon as a given text offers us more 
than one world within its projected textual realm, we are in fact presented only 
with an illusion. That is, no matter how convincingly a text may project levels that 
(seemingly) differ ontologically, such levels are, in reality, always confined to the 
same kind of space: a verbal space. Similarly, they are always constructed out of 
the same material: words.  There is not really anything that makes a given 
fictional ‘reality’ any more or less fictional (or ‘real’) than other possible 
‘realities’ within that very same text; they all exists only in the consciousness of 
the reader during his reading activities. 
 
4.6.5 Concrete prose: the discursive realm versus the material realm 
Certain frame-breaking activities are so radical that they not only emphasise or 
break boundaries that (pretend to) exist to us on a discursive level. In addition, 
such techniques call attention to, probably, the deepest ontological division of 
them all: the real solid existence of the book versus its projected world(s). By 
deliberately disturbing the flow of the reading process, the radical frame-breaking 
techniques that I want to investigate below, somewhat force the reader to 
acknowledge the physical reality of the book he is holding in his hand. Such 
strategies all exploit the physical space of the page through layout and innovative 
typography. 
 
Most readers of prose fiction have become accustomed to the traditional neat and 
static arrangement of horizontal lines on the page. We rarely pay attention to the 
way in which the words have been organised on the page - unless, of course, this 
is done in an unconventional and conspicuous manner. McHale argues that “the 
spacing-out of the text, along whatever axis or combination of axes, induces an 
ontological hesitation or oscillation between the fictional world and the real-world 
object – the material book” (184). There are inevitably countless ways in which 
the typography and the design of the page can be arranged: different geometrical 
shapes, blank spaces, juxtaposed segments of text, coloured pages, different type 
fonts and sizes, margins that have been meddled with, discourses arranged 
diagonally, vertically, or upside-down on the page, etc. (180-4).  
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Fictional writing in which printed matter has been given a particular form, 
McHale refers to as ““concrete prose” or “concrete fiction”” (184). “Like concrete 
poetry,” he continues, “many pieces of concrete prose are literally “verbal icons,” 
imitating through their shapes the shapes of objects or processes in the real world” 
(184). Thus, while such typographical icons may emphasise the materiality of the 
book on one level, they may also be said to serve a mimetic purpose on another 
level. Even if such ideograms are shaped into more abstract forms, they may still 
be perceived as “conceptual icons [that] lend a kind of concreteness and 
palpability to complex or diffuse or highly abstract ideas” (186). Hence, 
typographical icons may prove more appropriate for capturing and conveying 
certain ideas and concepts than more conventional formats. The deliberate 
shaping of textual segments thus somewhat function as an alternative way of 
articulating a story because it impedes the traditional “referential reading 
procedures”, as Jerome McGann observes (McGann 1993:74)17. In doing so, 
McGann continues, the reader cannot help but pay attention to the text’s 
“immediate and iconic condition, as if the words were images or objects in 
themselves, as if they were values in themselves (rather than vehicles for 
delivering some further value or meaning)” (emphasis original, 75). Hence, the 
text makes the reader shift between two different kinds of word processing: a 
referential (and arbitrary) one in which the words serve a symbolic function, and 
an iconic one in which the words are themselves turned into a concrete form that 
generates a visual resemblance between form and content.  
 
Common to these narrative strategies is that they all function as eye-catching 
devices which deliberately divert the reader’s attention away from the imaginary 
universe – the story - he is in the process of creating in his mind. He may even 
have to physically manoeuvre the book around in order for him to be able to read, 
for example, passages that are written upside-down. Such severe disturbances in 
the reading process inevitably pull the reader out of the discursive world and force 
                                                 
17 Although McGann’s comments are made in relation to his investigation of concrete poetry, I 
find that his observations prove useful in this context too. As already stated above, McHale claims 
that there are certain similarities between concrete poetry and concrete prose.  
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him to acknowledge the book as a physical object. In other words, these narrative 
techniques break the frame between the ‘reality’ of the fiction and the material 
world. By insisting on making its presence known, such ‘concrete’ fiction 
explicitly subverts the aim of the realist tradition in which “[n]othing must 
interfere with fiction’s representation of reality, [and] so the physical dimensions 
of the book must be rendered functionally invisible” (McHale 1999:181). 
Postmodern metafictions that call attention to their own ‘bookiness’ leave the 
reader subject to a two-way pull: he is constantly pulled back and forth between 
the book’s projected world(s) and the physical existence of the ‘real’ object in his 
hand: the book which is part of the reader’s own material world.  
 
In other words, when writers explore the physical space of the page in different 
manners as investigated above, the reader inevitably begins focussing on the 
actual arrangement of the words and the ways in which he makes sense of a given 
text through its use of signs. Consequently, the reader is unable to become fully 
absorbed in the projection of a fictional heterocosm as the text boldly and 
continuously declares its own status as an artefact by constantly disrupting the 
reading activities and making its physical dimensions visible. As a result, a sense 
of competition between the discursive realm and the material realm is generated, 
thus foregrounding the fact that these worlds are ontologically incompatible.    
 
Above, I have established theories primarily proposed by Waugh and McHale in 
order to reach a general definition of the metafictional novel, as well as some of 
the narrative strategies often employed in the more radical instances of such 
writing. We saw how the term metafiction in its most basic form can be 
considered a hybrid of theoretical and fictional writing: a borderline discourse that 
is aware of its own status as a linguistic construct and even flaunts this 
knowledge. In doing so, metafictional writing has a critical dimension to it in that 
it poses questions about the text-world relationship. Common to all the techniques 
investigated was the concept of frame-breaking: the deliberate attempt to 
foreground and render problematic the notion of frames and our usage of these 
both in fictional writing and in our everyday life. Setting up numerous fictional 
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worlds and, subsequently, destabilising or overtly tearing these down in various 
different manners, metafictional texts lay bare the conventions entailed in fiction-
making and, in addition, expose the ontological distinctness between the fictional 
world(s) and ‘reality’. We will now move on to Hutcheon’s concept of 
‘historiographic metafiction’ in which we find an overt concern with and 
problematisation of the very frame that, supposedly, separates fiction from 
historiography. 
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5.0 Historiographic metafiction 
Postmodernism, as we have seen, is concerned with questioning and rendering 
problematic concepts, domains, and institutions that have traditionally served as 
grounds for our perceptions of who we are and the world around us. The field of 
history, with its aim of recapturing and explaining the past to us, has traditionally 
been considered veracious. However, within the last three decades the traditional 
domain of history has become subject to a postmodern scrutinisation. In a 
postmodern context, the representation of past events – the writing of history – is 
considered a highly problematic task and it is precisely this crisis of representation 
that Hutcheon’s concept of ‘historiographic metafiction’ embodies and 
investigates. In the following, I will attempt to define this particular concept of 
self-reflexive writing and examine some of its main concerns. Furthermore, I want 
to look at the very explicit distinction that Hutcheon draws between 
‘historiographic metafiction’ and the more radical cases of metafictional writing, 
such as Federman’s surfictional novels. However, first of all it will be 
advantageous for us to briefly examine some of the theories put forward by 
Hayden White as they will prove essential to the topic at hand. 
 
5.1 Hayden White: metahistory 
White has been a central figure in the literary discussion about historiography that 
began in the 1970s. His theories on the methods, functions and nature of historical 
discourse seriously challenge the assumptions upon which the field of history has 
traditionally been based. As such, his work has caused much agitation amongst 
historians and many similarities between his work and that of both Derrida and 
Barthes are discernable (see chapter 3.0). White argues that there is a distinctive 
lack of self-reflexivity within the field of history and it is this view that has led 
him to an investigation of what he refers to as “metahistory” (White in Leitch 
(eds.), 2001:1712). In “The Historical Text as Literary Artefact” (1978), White 
argues that ‘metahistory’ is the practice of attempting “to get behind or beneath 
the presuppositions which sustain a given type of [historical] inquiry” (1712). 
White boldly postulates that, 
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[I]n general there has been a reluctance to consider historical narratives as 
what they most manifestly are: verbal fictions, the contents of which are as 
much invented as found and the forms of which have more in common with 
their counterparts in literature than they have with those in the sciences 
(emphasis original, 1713). 
 
 
White thus explicitly destabilises the distinction that is generally drawn between 
literary and historical writing; a distinction that hinges on the assumption that the 
former is concerned with representing the possible/imagined (fiction), whereas the 
latter takes as its object of representation the actual/‘real’ (fact). While somewhat 
conflating these two fields of writing, White nevertheless clearly acknowledges 
that it is in fact only possible to “know the actual by contrasting it with or 
likening it to the imaginable (emphasis original, 1727-8). White, in other words, 
does not do away with the ‘old’ binary opposition but instead he deconstructs this 
dichotomy and questions the concept of mimesis in historical narratives as well as 
its ontological status. History is generally perceived “as a kind of archetype of the 
“realistic” pole of representation” (1719), which rests on the assumption that such 
narrative has the ability to represent things the way they really are (or were). 
White points out, however, that ontologically speaking, historical discourses are 
no different from literary discourses: both exist as discursive constructs. In 
addition, White argues that the very mechanisms and ‘tools’ used in the act of 
fiction-making are no different from the ones used by the historian; novelists and 
historians are both producers of text. The historian cannot claim to have any 
access to ‘reality’ – past or present – outside of language, thus his description of 
any given event will always already in itself be an interpretation; never the 
‘original’ thing itself. “As a symbolic structure,” White maintains, 
 
the historical narrative does not reproduce the events it describes; it tells us 
in what direction to think about the events and charges our thought about 
the events with different emotional valences (emphasis original, 1721). 
 
 
Thus, the form and structure that the historian chooses for his historical account 
affect and shape our interpretation of the events and therefore also the meanings 
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we assign to them. What White is effectively arguing is that there is no such thing 
as (scientific) objectivity within the field of history; historical narratives are 
always imbued with certain values that characterise a given culture. Thus, 
historical narratives are always biased (1916). In emphasising the poetic nature of 
historical accounts, certain implications regarding referentiality and ‘truth’ 
emerge because “we cannot go and look at them [the original events] in order to 
see if the historian has adequately reproduced them in his narrative” (1718). There 
is no definitive materiality against which we can verify the historian’s claims. 
There are only texts; an increasing layer of (inter)textuality that makes the past 
even more impenetrable to us, 
 
Each new historical work only adds to the number of possible texts that 
have to be interpreted if a full and accurate picture of a given historical 
milieu is to be faithfully drawn. The relationship between the past to be 
analyzed and historical works produced by analysis of the documents is 
paradoxical; the more we know about the past, the more difficult it is to 
generalize about it (emphasis original, 1719). 
 
 
Despite this paradox, history inevitably continues to be written, and it is important 
to bear in mind that White does not dismiss the quest for historical knowledge as 
such. Rather, he points to the fact that one cannot make assertions about ‘what 
really happened’ without using representation. Everyone, including the historian, 
is involved in representation games all the time, thus historical narratives do not 
provide us with an unrestricted and unproblematic access to a historical ‘reality’, 
or ‘truth’. This is exactly what White urges historians to acknowledge, and it is 
something that is highly problematised and emphasised in historiographic 
metafiction, as we shall see below. 
 
5.2 Hutcheon’s historiographic metafiction 
In her seminal work A Poetics of Postmodernism, Hutcheon’s aim is to define 
what she refers to as the postmodern novel, that is, ‘historiographic metafiction’. 
As we have already established in the preceding section, metafiction is a type of 
writing that overtly incorporates theoretical discourse(s) into its fictional frame(s). 
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It thus deliberately undermines the factuality normally associated with criticism 
(and ‘reality’) and foregrounds its own status as a linguistic construct. Hutcheon 
argues that ‘historiographic metafiction’ is a particular form of the novel in which 
the domains of history, theory and literature are all incorporated. Historiographic 
metafiction, then, is not only concerned with the fields of criticism and literature, 
but also – and specifically - with interrogating the traditional concept of 
historiography. Hutcheon claims that historiographic metafiction’s “theoretical 
self-awareness of history and fiction as human constructs (historiographic 
metafiction) is made the grounds for its rethinking and reworking of the forms and 
contents of the past” (emphasis original, Hutcheon 1992:5). We are, in other 
words, dealing with a particular type of self-conscious writing that is specifically 
concerned with rendering problematic and unstable our notion of history and our 
knowability of the past, both in terms of form and contents. Thus, historiographic 
metafiction attempts to revise the contents of the (official) historical record, which 
is considered a non-given artefact. At the same time, it is also overtly concerned 
with examining the very conventions and forms that have governed texts of the 
past. 
 
As we have already seen in section 2.4, Hutcheon maintains that postmodern 
practices are generally characterised by a double and self-contradictory operation, 
which is manifested in (her reworking of) the concept of parody: a mode that 
simultaneously installs and subverts that which it parodies and, as a result, 
generates a sense of undecidability. In parodying past conventions or past events 
(or both), historiographic metafiction affords a critical stance: it makes unfamiliar 
the familiar – it destabilises that which is conventionally perceived as stable and 
permanent – by working within that which it ironically abuses. Historiographic 
metafiction engages in a dialogue with and a re-evaluation of the past by, literally, 
placing the past (as text) in the present (also as text). In Hutcheon’s view, it is the 
very use of parody that allows for historiographic metafictional practices to 
simultaneously point in two contradictory directions: inward and outward. She 
maintains that historiographic metafiction is “marked paradoxically by both 
history and an internalized, self-reflexive investigation of the nature, the limits, 
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and the possibilities of the discourse of art” (22). She argues that while such 
writing may appear to be exclusively introverted by its interrogation of itself, it is 
nevertheless the very use of parody, 
 
that paradoxically brings about a direct confrontation with the problem of 
the relation of the aesthetic to a world of significance external to itself, to a 
discursive world of socially defined meaning systems (past and present) – 
in other words, to the political and the historical (22). 
 
 
Hence, the use of parody in historiographic metafiction does not have as its main 
aim that of looking inward merely for the sake of doing so. Rather, this 
introspection becomes a means of examining and commenting on that which is 
exterior: the social discourses that constitute the political and historical world. 
Aesthetic introversion thus paradoxically becomes a way of moving beyond self-
reflexivity – of adding another (critical) level - and hence reaching the opposite 
pole, namely, extroversion.  
 
5.2.1 History in historiographic metafiction 
Hutcheon argues that in historiographic metafiction, 
 
History is not made obsolete: it is, however, being rethought – as a human 
construct. And in urging that history does not exist except as text, it does 
not stupidly and “gleefully” deny that the past existed, but only that its 
accessibility to us now is entirely conditioned by textuality (emphasis 
original, 16). 
 
 
The existence of the past is never contested in historiographic metafictional 
writing. Rather, such writing makes explicit that any access to the past is always 
only available to us through language. Representation thus always conditions 
what we (think we) know of the past, and our knowledge of the past can therefore 
never be reduced to a simple operation of “objective recording” (Hutcheon 
2002:70). In other words, our knowledge and understanding of the past always 
involve subjective acts, such as, selection, composition and evaluation of certain 
past events. It is in this relation, that the metafictional element of historiographic 
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metafiction serves one of its major functions. By adding a level of self-reflexivity 
to such writing, the interpretive aspects that govern any historiographic 
representation are brought to the fore, for example, by overt references to “the 
choice of narrative strategy, explanatory paradigm, or ideological encoding” (70-
1) employed in a given text. In explicitly foregrounding the very process of 
producing a historical narrative, the actual meaning-making operation is brought 
to the reader’s attention. In doing so, historiographic metafiction shows us that the 
mechanisms involved in historical accounts will always affect the objectivity and 
truth-value that we normally associate with the field of history. Historiographic 
metafictional writing teaches us that “the meaning and shape are not in the events, 
but in the systems which make those past “events” into present historical “facts”” 
(Hutcheon 1992:89) by laying bare the (ideological) systems in our culture 
through which events become significant to us; rather than pretending to represent 
such events to us with transparency. While historiographic metafiction never 
negates the existence of the past, it does however render history somewhat 
fictional and non-permanent: it revises the historical record and proposes 
alternative versions of history that do not necessarily comply with the officially 
accepted orthodoxies of the past. 
 
5.2.2 Departing from the norm: deliberate anomalies 
In order for us to fully understand how historiographic metafiction challenges the 
forms and conventions of past literary periods it will be fruitful for us to briefly 
investigate another particularly type of the novel to which history is also essential: 
the historical novel18. The historical novel arose in the 19th century and, according 
to M. H. Abrams, it “not only takes its setting and some characters and events 
from history, but makes the historical events and issues crucial for the central 
characters and narrative” (Abrams 1993: 133). The historical record thus clearly 
functions both as a motivating and shaping force in such writing, which also relies 
heavily on the conventions of traditional realism. In fact, McHale maintains that 
historical fiction has to rely on the realist mode of representation in order for it 
                                                 
18 McHale argues that “the conventions and norms of historical fiction” are being revised and 
transformed in the postmodern version of the classic historical novel (McHale 1999: 90).  
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not to be considered “an anomaly” (McHale 1999:88). Hence, the mix of the 
fictional and the historical in the classic historical novel is never foregrounded but 
rather these two ontologically distinct spheres are represented as natural and 
unproblematic extensions of one another. Thus, the conventional border between 
the two realms is rendered somewhat invisible (or non-existent). The assumptions 
that lie behind historiography and literary writing are hence never questioned or 
violated in the historical novel. Instead, historical events or characters are 
incorporated into the fictional frame in order to lend to the novel a sense of 
authenticity and verifiability.  
 
Historiographic metafiction, which McHale refers to as the “postmodernist 
revisionist historical novel” (90), sets out to challenge and destabilise the 
relationship between historical material and fictional invention. It aims at being 
“an anomaly” in order for it not to conform to the traditional paradigm and hence 
achieve its critical stance. According to Hutcheon, there is a strong tendency in 
postmodern writing to employ narrative strategies that explicitly challenge the 
assumptions of realist writing, which posits the existence of a “direct and natural 
link between sign and referent or between word and world” (Hutcheon 2002:32). 
Hence, the realist medium itself is perceived as having an inherent ability to 
reflect the empirical world and historical events in a faithful and true manner. In 
historiographic metafiction, on the other hand, the postmodern view of history as 
first and foremost discourse seems to prevail, thus insisting that any historical 
document always already constitutes an act of interpretation. That is, 
historiographic metafiction does not pretend, nor does it attempt to generate the 
effect, that it is capable of rendering historical reality as it really was. I.e., history 
is viewed as “a text, a discursive construct upon which fiction draws as easily as it 
does upon other texts of literature” (Hutcheon 1992:142). As a result, we 
somewhat enter an intertextual realm since “reference in literature is never 
anything but one of text to text and that, therefore, history as used in 
historiographic metafiction, for instance, could never refer to any actual empirical 
world, but merely to another text” (143).  
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But if both history and fiction are conflated into text, how then can these two 
fields differ? As discursive acts, both historical and literary narratives inevitably 
do exist to us only as “verbal fictions”, as pointed out by White above. The 
conventional (and presumed) difference lies in what Hutcheon refers to as “the 
common-sense distinction between two kinds of reference: what history refers to 
is the actual, real world; what fiction refers to is a fictive universe” (142). It is 
from this very traditional distinction that historiographic metafiction derives its 
force – its ability to render reference in historiography problematic and unstable. 
McHale makes a similar distinction between two types of reference: “an internal 
(fictional) field of reference and an external (real-world) field” (McHale 1999:86). 
A tension between these two different fields will always exist, however, this 
tension is highlighted and deliberately exacerbated within historiographic 
metafiction; primarily through the use of frame-breaking techniques (established 
in sections 4.6.1-5). Generating a border between what we generally accept as the 
factual19 and the imagined only to subsequently blur it produces a sense of 
undecidability. History in historiographic metafiction is always placed within an 
explicitly fictional framework. As a result, historiographic metafiction seriously 
questions the validity and truthfulness of the historical record by making explicit 
its discursive nature and its process of enunciation. Such writing ultimately 
suggests that our knowledge of the past (individual and collective) may, 
potentially, be constructed in an indefinite number of ways; truth always operates 
in plurality. Historiographic metafiction thus sets out to explore new modes of 
articulating the past and does so through an ironic examination and revision of 
conventional modes of articulation and official codes of representation. 
Historiographic metafictional writing is, in other words, “fictionalized history 
with a parodic twist” (Hutcheon 2002:50). 
 
5.3 Hutcheon’s model of postmodernism 
Before we move on to the actual analysis of Federman’s surfictional writing, it 
will be worthwhile to briefly look at Hutcheon’s perception of American 
                                                 
19 This amounts to what Hutcheon elsewhere calls “extra-literary narrative discourses” which 
encompass “history, biography, [and] autobiography” (Hutcheon 1992:224). 
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surfiction in relation to the paradigm of postmodernism that she sets forth. As 
already mentioned in the introduction, Hutcheon explicitly excludes from her 
model of postmodernism American surfictional writing. Hutcheon sees surfictions 
“as extensions of modernist notions of autonomy and auto-referentiality and thus 
as ‘late modernist.’ These formalist extremes are precisely what are called into 
question by the historical and social grounding of postmodern fiction” (27). Thus, 
in Hutcheon’s view, American surfiction is not characterised by the paradoxical 
double mode of operation that enables a text to move beyond self-referentially, 
which her own definition of postmodernism hinges on. Instead, she maintains that 
American surfictions are “non-mimetic, ultra-autonomous, [and] anti-referential” 
(Hutcheon 1992:52). Hence, Hutcheon is of the opinion that reference in 
American surfiction is simply bracketed or denied; whereas in historiographic 
metafiction reference is always problematised and at the same time, paradoxically, 
invoked in the very act of rendering it problematic. There is no ironic subversion 
or problematisation of reference in surfiction, she argues, only rejection (xii). 
Unfortunately, however, Hutcheon does not offer any analytical examples to 
support her argument and thus illustrate the points she makes about American 
surfiction. It would have been helpful if Hutcheon had included at least one, albeit 
brief, example of a specific American surfictional text in order to demonstrate 
through textual analysis just how it differs from historiographic metafiction in her 
view.  
 
Contrary to Hutcheon, I want to argue that Federman’s radical metafictions can 
also be read as historiographic metafictions; that his works do fit the definition of 
the postmodern novel as put forward by Hutcheon. Federman’s novels, as will be 
evident in the forthcoming analysis, certainly both confront and render 
problematic the historical in a very explicit manner. The obsession with knowing 
and (re-)constructing the past can be discerned in Federman’s novels both on a 
thematic and a formal level. Rather than denying reference, as Hutcheon argues, I 
propose that Federman instead is preoccupied with the instability of representation 
and the limitations that language imposes on him as he is desperately trying to 
narrate a past of unspeakable events.  
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In light of the above dismissal of surfiction from her paradigm of postmodern 
fiction, the following assertion by Hutcheon appears almost paradoxical given that 
her approach provides the fulcrum for my reading of Federman’s Double or 
Nothing and Take It or Leave It, 
 
Fiction does not mirror reality; nor does it reproduce it. It cannot. There is 
no pretense of simplistic mimesis in historiographic metafiction. Instead, 
fiction is offered as another of the discourses by which we construct our 
versions of reality, and both the construction and the need for it are what are 
foregrounded in the postmodernist novel (40). 
 
 
 
Above, we have seen how the postmodern scrutinisation of the field of history, as 
manifested in White’s concept of metahistory, may be tentatively linked to the 
concept of historiographic metafiction. Pointing to the nature of historical 
accounts as literary artefacts and a distinctive lack of self-reflexivity within 
historiography, White emphasises certain shared features of historical and literary 
writing. Arguing that, similarly to the novelist, the historian makes use of 
representation, White disputes the conventional perception that historical 
discourses provide us with an unrestricted and objective access to a historical 
‘reality’. Subsequently, we defined historiographic metafiction as a self-
contradictory practice that highlights its own status as fiction while, 
simultaneously, laying claims to historical events. Obsessed with the knowability 
of the past, this type of writing attempts to revise the official historical record by 
presenting itself as an oppositional counter story to such hegemonic discourse. 
Pointing to the discursive nature of history, historiographic metafiction 
deliberately unmasks the realist assumptions that govern historical accounts by 
rendering problematic and unstable the concept of referentiality.  
 
Having established a comprehensive theoretical framework and numerous 
analytical tools, we shall now proceed with the second, and analytical, part of this 
thesis where I shall offer close readings of Federman’s Double or Nothing and 
Take It or Leave It in light of the above theories. 
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6.0 Analysis 
6.1 Introducing Raymond Federman 
Raymond Federman has been a practitioner of innovative writing over the last 
four decades, and his work has played a crucial role in terms of challenging, 
questioning and radically subverting the more traditionally accepted forms of 
literature. Federman’s writing is highly inventive, dynamic and thought provoking 
and he has published numerous novels, poems, articles, and critical essays. 
Federman is bilingual and he writes fluently in both French and English, often 
combining the two. He is the inventor of terms such as ‘surfiction’ and 
‘critifiction’ that both refer to self-reflexive borderline discourses in which 
theoretical and literary writing overlap. Federman’s fiction is usually fiction that 
explores fiction and the problematic concept of representation – the relationship 
between ‘reality’ and text. However, there is also another central and very urgent 
element that continuously haunts Federman’s writing: he has an unusual story to 
tell, a story that requires a linguistic representation yet continuously defies such 
rendition. According to Federman himself, 
 
It is necessary to speak, to write, and keep on speaking and writing (lest we 
forget) about the Jewish Holocaust during the Nazi period even if words 
cannot express this monstrous event. 
 
It is impossible to speak or write about the Holocaust because words cannot 
express this monstrous event (Federman, http 1). 
 
 
 
This is the dilemma inherent in all Federman’s writing; and he has spent the 
majority of his career as a writer trying to narrate a past of unspeakable events; a 
past made up of horrific and absurd experiences that Federman desperately and 
stubbornly attempts to put into writing in order for him to grasp it and obtain a 
sense of personal enlightenment – but also for posterity. Federman, who is of 
Jewish descent, was born on May 15, 1928, in Paris, France. During World War 
II, when he was still only a boy, his parents and two sisters were deported to 
Auschwitz where they were exterminated. Federman only miraculously escaped 
death because his mother pushed him into a closet on the landing as the Gestapo 
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were on their way up the stairs to the family’s third floor apartment in Paris. This 
happened on July 16, 1942, and ever since his symbolic rebirth in that closet, 
Federman has been writing and re-writing the (hi)story of his eventful life – an 
ongoing project that is still in the making. Having escaped the Holocaust – at least 
physically – Federman’s books can be seen as his attempt to also survive 
mentally. His literary works are clearly marked by a chaotic and traumatic past of 
having been brutally robbed of his immediate family at a young age; of having 
lost his identity and childhood; of living in exile and being forced to establish a 
new life and identity as a displaced person in another country (America). While 
the Nazi genocide always looms somewhere in the background of Federman’s 
writing, his fictions never deal directly with this incomprehensible event. Rather, 
the central subject matter is always concerned with what it means to be a Jewish 
writer in the post-Holocaust epoch, and of the inadequacy of language to possibly 
ever express and represent this historical event, which demands to be told and re-
told - even if it cannot be. 
 
In the following, I want to analyse Federman’s two surfictional novels, Double or 
Nothing and Take It or Leave It, employing the analytical tools established in the 
first part of this thesis. Through my analysis, I will examine some of the narrative 
techniques and instances of, predominantly radical, frame-breaking discernable in 
these texts. Moreover, I will attempt to situate the two novels within a 
historiographic metafictional paradigm and, thus, illustrate that although these 
novels may be extreme in their degree of metafictionality, they nevertheless 
remain deeply rooted in a historical ‘reality’. Hence, they remain paradoxical by 
simultaneously pointing in two directions: inward and outward. 
 
6.2 Double or Nothing 
Federman’s debut novel Double or Nothing is complex, self-reflexive and highly 
unconventional and is comprised of numerous different ontological levels. In 
addition, it is an extraordinary visual experience as each page has been uniquely 
designed and shaped by Federman’s innovative use of typography. Double or 
Nothing is a self-contradictory and self-cancelling text in which the main subject 
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matter is the painstaking attempt at writing the story of a young Jewish man who 
survived the Holocaust. While this text both explores and reflects upon the 
possibilities of the novel as a medium, it is also an overt dramatisation of the 
difficult process of uncovering a traumatic and unspeakable past. In the following, 
I want to examine the use of metafictional narrative techniques employed in this 
novel, which are discernable both on a thematic and formal level. In addition, I 
want to look at how the historical past is approached and represented within an 
explicitly fictional framework, thus moving this analysis into the realm of 
historiographic metafiction. 
 
“You start just like that” 
To most people, it seems logical to start at the beginning. But ‘logic’ is perhaps a 
mere construct – a guiding principle that we have come to take for granted; and 
not a natural given - just like beginnings. Federman certainly seems to imply this 
and, in a sense, this is a discourse that somewhat defies logic and order, and 
delights instead in irrationality and disorder. This is clear from the very onset of 
Double or Nothing as we are told that in fact “THIS IS NOT THE BEGINNING” 
(Federman, 1971:0). The text that follows immediately after this puzzling and 
paradoxical heading is no less contradictory: “Once upon a time (two or three 
weeks ago)” (0). Deliberately mocking this somewhat conventional fairytale 
opening and employing it at the very beginning of a text that, apparently, does not 
really start here anyway (so we are told), most certainly suggests that something 
peculiar and playful is going on. As it turns out, “THIS IS NOT THE 
BEGINNING” (together with “SUMMARY OF THE DISCOURSE” at the end of 
the book) constitutes a meta-narrative that somewhat frames what we may 
tentatively refer to as the story-proper – another ontological world that exists 
within the story and whose real “BEGINNING” is not explicitly indicated until 
we reach page 1. The ‘non-beginning’ status assigned to this meta-discourse is 
further emphasised by its unusual page numbers, which run from 0 to 
000000000.0, thus implying the existence of a potentially endless textual space 
that exists in-between the numbers 0 and 1. It is simply a matter of adding zeros in 
order for this extra-diegetic realm to expand and thus postpone the beginning (of 
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the nested narrative). The overt claims that this section should not really be 
considered part of the story-proper certainly raise some interesting and central 
questions in terms of how and when a text begins (and, by extension, ends) which 
are continually alluded to throughout the text. Thus, Federman deliberately mocks 
our expectations and opens up to a potential endless circularity, which I shall 
return to later. Page 0 may, in other words, not be the beginning – but it is 
nevertheless a beginning: our threshold into this multi-layered textual universe 
created by Federman. 
 
We soon discover that this meta-narrative does in fact serve a number of 
functions. First of all, it introduces the story that has not yet begun: the 
(embedded) story-proper. While somewhat forming the story behind the story 
within the story, this meta-discourse is also quite literally placed in front of the 
nested narrative in a double sense. That is, the meta-section is situated in front of 
the story within the story in terms of the succession of page numbers, while it also 
generates a textual layer in front of the embedded story: it constitutes yet another 
ontological realm or frame that we need to penetrate in order for us to ‘reach’ the 
embedded story. Furthermore, the meta-section offers us a thorough and careful 
explanation of the four-level narrative hierarchy that makes up the text. In doing 
so, this section clearly lays bare before our very eyes the conventions employed in 
constructing a fictional heterocosm; it exposes itself as fiction and the conventions 
entailed in its own making.  Ironically, the idea of overtly establishing this neatly 
structured framework is done only for it to be playfully broken down during the 
course of the novel. Thus, it is essential to examine closely the “intramural setup” 
(00000) as it introduces us to a number of different authorial voices that are all 
present within Federman’s discourse. As will be evident, these four different 
voices form the basis for dialogue and create a tension between the ontological 
levels established; most importantly between fact and fiction which ultimately 
leads to a confrontation with the (fictional) past. Finally, this section also allows 
for a partial pre-empting of the novel itself. That is, the main elements that 
constitute the majority of the story to come are somewhat already contained 
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within and revealed to us during the novel’s first pages; albeit in a condensed and 
summarised version. 
 
The setup 
If the “THIS IS NOT THE BEGINNING” section frames the story-proper, we 
may also refer to this discourse as the text’s primary world, or diegesis. However, 
while positing itself as the highest level within the narrative structure of the novel 
as a whole, this section does not constitute the primary world of the embedded 
story, hence its function as a meta-narrative. The meta-section can be attributed to 
someone who makes his presence known by claiming in a footnote that he, 
ironically, is “hidden somewhere in the background omnipresent omnipotent and 
omniscient to control direct dictate a behaviour to the three other unfortunate 
beings” (000000000.0). Presumably this fourth voice represents the implied 
author of the text: Federman-the-paper-author, who inhabits the supernal position 
of the narrative hierarchy. In this footnote, the fourth person reflects upon his own 
position within the novel’s setup and explicitly admits to having composed the 
preceding pages (the meta-narrative). Ultimately, it is he who pulls the strings. 
Paradoxically, however, this admission of authority only raises the question of 
who, in turn, pulls the strings of the one pulling the strings. By overtly writing 
himself into the discourse, thus turning himself into a textual construct, the fourth 
person’s attempt at asserting his own authority nevertheless proves ineffective. 
Instead, this gesture implies that indeed there may be someone else situated even 
further above the fourth person within the narrative hierarchy, and so on. Already 
at this point, before the beginning, Federman generates a sense of infinity that 
makes us wonder just how far we need to ascent through layers of text before we 
reach ‘reality’20.  
 
Gradually descending within this recursive structure, we find “a rather stubborn 
and determined middle-aged man” (0) whose task it is to record to his best 
abilities and as accurately as possible the activities of yet another man, namely the 
                                                 
20 This is even further emphasised and complicated by the fact that the footnote itself somewhat 
constitutes a realm that exists outside, yet also forms part of, the meta-narrative. 
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teller or inventor. We learn that the inventor, who is also described as an 
“irresponsible paranoiac fellow” and “inveterate gambler” (00), intends to seclude 
himself for 365 days in a room in New York in order for him to produce a novel 
about the protagonist of the story (within the story within the story): a young 
French Jewish man who is about to start a new life in America after his immediate 
family has been killed during the Holocaust - a background, we may note, that is 
conspicuously similar to that of Federman. Hence, we have four different voices 
within this discourse whose relations and positions may be summarised as follows 
(for the time being): the first person (the recorder/hypodiegetic world), who 
records the activities of the second person (the inventor/hypo-hypodiegetic 
world), who invents the story of the third person (the protagonist/hypo-hypo-
hypodiegetic world), who awaits his existence. Finally, all of these beings and 
their actions are being monitored and controlled by the fourth person (the implied 
author/diegesis). In other words, we have a setup that consists of many different 
voices and levels, however, it appears to be well planned and straightforward. But 
of course there is a playful twist to this setup – as it turns out, it is in fact the 
reader, more than anyone, who is being ‘set up’. While the meta-discourse does 
reveal that certain frame-breaking acts will occur in the story to come – the teller 
and his tale will eventually blend together (0000) – we are not warned of the 
degree to which the frame-breaking activities in this discourse are really going to 
extend. This, I shall return to later, but first I want to examine closely the 
embedded narrative, the inventor, and some of the narrative techniques he 
employs in order for us to establish how the historical past is both approached and 
represented in this novel. 
 
The story-proper: a possible world 
Following the meta-narrative, we find the story-proper as it is, ostensibly, 
recorded by the first person. This is a strictly hypothetical realm based solely on 
the assumption that “the room costs 8 dollars” (1) on a weekly basis. In other 
words, this is the underlying condition for this ontological sphere that thus comes 
to exist in possibility only. This overtly plausible world makes up the majority of 
Double or Nothing, and within it, the realms of particularly the inventor and the 
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protagonist are repeatedly played off against one another, resulting in some 
interesting instances of frame-breaking and an overt dramatisation of the 
struggling teller as he attempts to produce a narrative (fiction) about the past 
(‘truth’). 
 
The teller has been given an unusual dual task: he needs to organise and calculate 
the essential items he will require for his one year seclusion that is to commence 
the following day, on October the 1st. At the same time, he is also responsible for 
inventing and structuring the protagonist’s story and decides to try out various 
narrative techniques so as to be better prepared for his writing activities the next 
day. However, if the teller is to succeed in this difficult undertaking, he must 
“avoid (at all cost) talking about his own life, or better yet to forget about himself 
completely (at least until he and his invention converge and merge), so as to better 
concentrate on the life of the young man who, certainly, has had a much more 
interesting life than the second person” (0000). As we follow the mental activities 
and projections of the teller, who apparently is now “on his own” (000000000), it 
becomes evident that this is not an easy task, especially when it comes to 
refraining from talking about his own life, and interestingly enough, the 
possibility of an autobiographical source is introduced at a very early point of this 
discourse, as we shall see. The fact that this is not a conventional representation of 
the protagonist’s story (a single unproblematic diegesis), but rather a 
representation of the diligent act of composing such a story is crucial. Having two 
distinct worlds co-existing and interacting in various ways allows for a 
metafictional dimension and calls attention to the meaning-making operations 
entailed in the inventor’s project. This is an undertaking that involves numerous 
subjective aspects such as the problematic selection of material (‘real’ or 
invented), narrative strategies, composition, etcetera, which are being carefully 
evaluated and tested by the inventor as the story unfolds, cancels, and re-unfolds 
in his mind. 
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A possible autobiographical source 
Attempting to compose the protagonist’s story, the inventor is quick to consider 
the prospect of basing it on autobiographical experiences. After all, he claims, 
“there is enough to tell without inventing” (7), and therefore, our inventor  
 
 
           (3)21
 
Later on, the teller again informs us that as for the events of the protagonist, 
 
 
      (31) 
 
These are important segments as they introduce a crucial element of Federman’s 
text: the (possible) autobiographical aspect, eventually culminating in the merging 
of the teller and his invention, which the teller himself, apparently, knows is 
inevitable. In this connection, it will be relevant to just briefly establish the most 
basic defining features of autobiographical writing, which according to Jerome 
Bruner amount to, 
 
A narrator, in the here and now, takes upon himself or herself the task of 
describing the progress of a protagonist in the there and then, one who 
happens to share his name. He must by convention bring that protagonist 
                                                 
21 Due to Federman’s unique use of typography, I have chosen to utilise facsimile copies of certain 
textual segments from his novels, which will be presented as direct quotations within the body of 
this study.  
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from the past into the present in such a way that the protagonist and the 
narrator eventually fuse and become one person with a shared 
consciousness (Bruner in Brockmeier, 2001:33).  
 
This type of writing, in other words, sets up a textual space in which a present-
being may examine and investigate a past-being, eventually bringing that past-
being into the present, fusing the two beings. Inevitably, such text must always be 
comprised of at least two levels, a world of the past and a world of the present, 
that remain distinct up until the very point where they eventually meet. I want to 
argue that it is this very process that is being dramatised on a thematic level and 
performed on a formal level within Federman’s discourse. Though, of course, this 
is not done in a simplistic and straightforward way, as for example, traditional 
realism would have it. Rather, Double or Nothing may be seen as an example of 
postmodern autobiographical writing, which is imbued with strong metafictional 
impulses, undecidability and ontological implications. 
 
While the above excerpts from Double or Nothing imply that the teller to some 
extent bases the protagonist’s story on events similar to those that comprise his 
own personal history, we can obviously not accept this statement at face value. 
Seemingly unable to make up his mind, his intentions of using material from his 
own life are constantly asserted only to be counterbalanced a moment later, 
“doesn’t matter if its not auto=biographical one can always invent a little it’s 
normal” (Federman, 1971:104). This is clearly a self-contradicting narrator who 
deprives us of any fixed demarcation between fact and fiction, as he explicitly 
alternates freely between remembering and inventing, thus rendering any given 
element “exactly how the whole thing happened approximately” (my emphasis, 
26). We are therefore completely deprived of any stable framework upon which 
factual notions may be verified. In addition, another possible source is introduced, 
as the inventor occasionally maintains that the story of the French Jewish 
immigrant has in fact been told to him first-hand: “I remember (he [the 
protagonist] said to me once)” (74). Consequently, such claims make it even more 
difficult for us to conclude anything for certain other than the fact that everything 
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the inventor tells us could, potentially, be fictional. After all, this is “a real 
fictitious discourse” as the novel’s subtitle suggests. 
 
“Remembering is always a confusing process” 
The mind of the inventor is perhaps best described as haphazard. While we are 
already aware of his paranoia and passion for gambling and taking risks, we also 
find our inventor in a situation where he is clearly pushed for time and unable to 
stay focussed. His incoherent cognitive state is repeatedly manifested through his 
constant digressions and sidetracking ventures as he ponders various subjects, 
such as alarm clocks on a global scale, the benefits of giving up smoking, and the 
lifespan of chewing gum and toothbrushes. And, of course, he is not really on his 
own after all but rather one voice amongst many, situated within a system of 
narratives. Everything he does is accessible to us only through the recorder’s 
representation of the teller’s activities, which in turn is carefully monitored and 
controlled by the fourth person.  
 
In any case, basing a story on (ostensive) autobiographical material inevitably 
involves the process of recalling what actually happened, or what one thinks 
happened, which is not an unproblematic activity for our narrator. As he points 
out, “remembering is always a confusing process”, which does not take place in a 
“in a straight line” (44). “C-H-R-O-N-O-L-O-G-I-C-A-L-O-R-D-E-R” (44), in 
other words, is always an illusion generated (or imposed) by the linguistic 
representation of such memories. Traditional realism and historical accounts in 
particular purport to such chronological rendition, thus implying the notion of 
telos. While such memories can only be grasped and gain meaning through sign 
systems, Federman does not conform to the realist mode of representation. Rather, 
he makes explicit the notion that any representation of the past (‘real’ or invented) 
will always be an invention (an artefact) as opposed to a natural phenomenon; 
always already imbued with interpretation and never stable. We are thus left with 
little (if any) indication of where memory stops and imagination starts – of where 
imagination takes over and fills in the gaps in our mind that we are unable to 
recall – of where the linguistic structures shape and contaminate these memories 
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in order for them to gain meaning. Presenting us with an inventor that oscillates 
endlessly between the realms of memory and imagination, Federman points to the 
frail and slippery qualities of memory and celebrates instead the imagination - 
“One can always invent a little. Particularly if it’s not possible to remember” 
(144). This is further demonstrated by the fact that Federman has situated the 
‘real’ story at the very core of the novel; deep down a vast and self-reflexive 
textual hierarchy. Whenever we are presented with fragments of the protagonist’s 
story, these have always already passed through several other voices, i.e., 
numerous interpretative acts have always already been conducted. This is, of 
course, no coincidence but rather it serves to illustrate the impossibility of ever 
bringing to a halt or seizing the original event (or signified) in a pure and ‘true’ 
state. 
 
In addition, the tricky process of remembering is also brought to the fore as the 
teller concerns himself with the essential items required for his one-year isolation,  
 
 
           (66) 
 
Frantically trying to keep track of everything, the teller resorts to the making of 
various lists, and therefore we frequently encounter sudden exclamations such as, 
“Should make a list (quick) before I forget” (5), and “Make a list QUICK” (37). 
These lists become the inventor’s desperate attempts at remembering everything 
down to the smallest detail, knowing very well that without such systematic 
approach, the whole project is likely to fail. Constructing lists therefore becomes 
an obsessive act (of survival) for our inventor, which is made playfully obvious 
when he offers us “examples […] of possible lists” (32), naturally in the shape of 
yet another list. But while lists, on the one hand, may lend a feeling of security 
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and orderliness to a paranoid and, seemingly, forgetful mind, they also serve 
another purpose: they enable him to “keep above the surface” (31), he hopes. In 
other words, the inventor’s lists and infinitesimal calculations also function as a 
mechanism that allows for evasions at appropriate moments. These are most 
noticeable at times when we encounter elements of the past that, seemingly, are 
too painful for the narrator to go into. Knowing fully well that “THINGS HAVE 
TO MOVE SOMEWHERE - - - - - - - - - - - - YOU’VE GOT TO GO 
SOMEPLACE” (56), the excessive degree to which the teller focuses on the 
provisions for his seclusion results in a continuous postponement of the moment 
when he has to face the ‘real’ story. That is, his calculations enable him to keep 
moving by adding more words to his discourse; even if this means moving away 
from the ‘real’ story to such an extent that it actually never really gets told. Hence, 
the course along which the diversions allow the discourse to move is best 
described as circular, as the inventor constantly manages to swerve the 
unthinkable elements that presumably make up the protagonist’s (or his own) 
story. Instead, he ends up circling around these, always only approximating these 
facts but never actually reaching them. 
 
There are numerous instances in the text where we find the teller desperately 
intruding upon his own discourse over and over. Ironically, the continuous effort 
he makes to evade certain issues only makes them more conspicuous to us. 
Contemplating the difficult situation the protagonist will be in on his arrival in 
America, for example, the inventor suddenly realises that he may be on the verge 
of revealing more than he intended to, “A guy’s got to be careful. No 
sentimentality either Got to tell it straight” (21). However, this assertion is 
immediately followed by an abrupt intrusion that takes us back (yet again) to his 
financial estimations and away from the story he is trying to compose,  
“--------------- $ 3.45 for toothpaste ---------- Right!  
AND-WHAT-ABOUT-THE-TOOTHBRUSH-DO-I-GET-ONE-OR-DO-I-NOT-
GET-ONE-AND-WHAT” (21). There is clearly ‘something’ rather serious 
looming below the surface, which the teller is desperately trying to circumvent; 
something that he does not want to, or cannot, go into. While the teller attempts to 
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make the whole project pass for a mere game by deliberately downplaying the 
significance of any grave issues that may surface, we get the feeling that someone 
above him may possibly be intervening with his discourse,  
 
 
                  (57) 
 
This segment, I would argue, works as a mise-en-abyme as it very accurately 
captures the essence of what is going on in Federman’s discourse. That is, while 
the teller playfully “noodle[s] around” (00), digressing and obsessing, there are 
some serious aspects to this narrative, which he is reluctant, or unable, to fully 
reveal. 
 
Circling the past 
This is dramatised on various occasions as the inventor intrudingly comments on 
the story he is in the process of articulating by way of cancelling it out right 
before our very eyes. While he insists that “this is not […] a Jewish story” (40), 
his intrusive remarks nevertheless imply something else. For instance, when the 
inventor decides to name his protagonist Dominique, only to change his mind 
(again) a moment later, 
 
 
     (181) 
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The Jewish issues are made clear in the above segment as the necessity of having 
a name that somewhat conveys Jewishness is central, yet at the same time in 
conflict with the inventor’s urgent wish to also move on and forget about these 
(unavoidable) historical facts. Such double and self-contradictory strategy of 
affirmation followed by negation occurs over and over in Federman’s novel. This 
approach is particularly noticeable as the teller considers where to start the 
protagonist’s story. The teller is adamant that there will be “nothing before New 
York”, which means, 
 
 
           (42) 
 
This is emphasised again later on,  
 
After all these were important years yes very important years he [the 
protagonist] was leaving behind THE TRAIN THE CAMP THE FARM we 
are not going to discuss. Yes nothing of the past. A clear break. 
Symbolically that is (69). 
 
 
Calling attention to these traumatic past events only as a means of explicitly 
stating that they will not form part of the narrative - that they “won’t come into 
this story” (135) - paradoxically has the opposite effect. The strenuous and 
persistent efforts to take back or annul any narrated segments that presumably 
make up the ‘real’ story of the young Jew’s past merely foreground their present 
absence. Remaining forever strangely discernable “there in the background” (39), 
these unspeakable elements of the past are always presented to us as being under 
erasure, which generates an ontological tension between presence and absence. 
While they continue to haunt the inventor’s discourse, the few glimpses we do get 
of the past are always only carefully alluded to in Federman’s novel through the 
teller’s incessant and somewhat compulsive reciting of ‘the war the camp the 
Jews’, etcetera. He can neither avoid nor drop the subject entirely. In other words, 
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this traumatic historical occurrence is turned into something that requires yet 
simultaneously refuses representation, implying that there is more to this story 
than meets the eye, so to speak, but that it can never be successfully seized or 
recovered. 
 
Rendering insignificant any aspects pertaining to his Jewish background this is, 
nevertheless, a side of the story that continuously re-emerges despite the teller’s 
efforts at concealment. While he maintains that any atrocious element of the past 
may simply be skipped by “jump[ing] ahead” (42) in the narrative, it would seem 
that certain constraints of history do present a real problem to the teller’s 
discourse. Subjecting the protagonist to numerous “practical questions”22 (151), 
the teller suddenly finds himself confronted with the problematic element of ‘real’ 
historical time, 
 
However if he is born the same year as I was born – 1928 – then the story 
must take place in the past – unless it’s a coincidence – in order that the two 
of us may not be the same person. If however we decide to make the story 
more contemporary then we will have to change his birthdate. He could be 
born in 1948 for instance. But that means that we have to skip the War the 
Jews the Farm the Camps entirely because he would not yet have been born 
when it all happened. That fucks up the whole story (152). 
 
 
This presents us with a major paradox inherent in Federman’s novel: while being 
overtly self-reflexive and never denying its own status as a fictional construct, this 
is a discourse that nevertheless lays claim to important historical events. It is 
almost as if this monstrous event imposes its (absent) presence onto this explicitly 
fictional realm; generating a tension between ‘reality’ and fiction. Realising this 
dilemma, the inventor decides that “it’s better to […] throw the whole story […] 
into a fictitious past” (152). And that, of course, is exactly what Federman has 
done with this discourse by situating it deep inside an overtly fictional and 
multilayered framework. 
                                                 
22 This two-way interaction between the inventor and the protagonist clearly destabilises the 
frames between the two as the protagonist himself, apparently, answers the questions posed by his 
inventor.  
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The room 
Let us backtrack for a moment and go back to the so-called “BEGINNING” (1) of 
the embedded story. Here, one of the most essential elements of the novel is 
introduced; an element that we have not yet dealt with: the room. “[T]he room”, 
we are told, “is important / extremely IMPORTANT” (1). Indeed, references to 
the room keep recurring on several occasions during the course of the novel, and 
the importance of the room to the whole project cannot be ignored, as the teller 
repeatedly returns to the subject and explains that “It all boils down to the ROOM 
/ the ROOM is at the core of the whole thing / without the ROOM nothing can be 
done” (101). Isolating himself for 365 days in the claustrophobic enclave of a 
single room with the intension of having “Nothing to do with the outside world” 
(37) seems a bit extreme to most people. Nevertheless, these are the exceptional 
conditions under which the inventor plans to write his story. Refraining from 
explaining in elaborate terms why such conditions are essential to his writing 
process, the teller does drop a few hints. Inferring that solitude is required in order 
for him to achieve a state of “Complete concentration” (67) to compose his story, 
it is, however, the teller’s subsequent comment that produces a striking effect. 
Adding that, “I begin to understand now what they mean by CONCENTRATION 
(concentration camps)” (67), a process of (subconscious?) association appears to 
have been triggered. Once more, a fragment of the ‘real’ story emerges to the 
surface of the discourse – literally made present to us only in its absence, which is 
signalled by the use of parentheses. But there is an even more conspicuous 
instance in the text where a possible link between the room and the unspeakable 
past is implied. Evaluating the possible storage facilities and interior arrangement 
of his (potential) room, the teller concludes that,  
 
 
     (35) 
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In my view, it is no coincidence that Federman’s text presents us with a quotation 
from his own poem “Escape”23 (Federman 1992:10), thus invoking his symbolic 
rebirth as a survivor of the Holocaust. Only because of the closet did he manage to 
escape death. Closets and rooms, of course, are remarkably similar in their 
physical dimensions, and as Thomas Hartl suggests, the inventor’s seclusion in 
the room may very well be an attempt to re-enact “the “closet experience,” but 
this time extended in time so that there will be enough time to try hard at solving 
the riddle, at deciphering the meaning of the darkness in the closet” (Hartl, 1995: 
58). The inventor’s ongoing effort to re-create conditions similar to those under 
which the original experience took place implies both a strong desire and an 
urgent need to comprehend (through re-enactment) once and for all this 
incomprehensible episode; to find the answers to all the unanswered questions 
that this event actuated. It is, of course, noteworthy that the only overt reference to 
the “closet experience” in Double or Nothing is actually to another text (i.e., 
signifier). That is, the experience is presented to us in an already mediated form; 
available to us as one of Federman’s previous attempts to render into words his 
unthinkable past. This clearly suggests the impossibility of ever seizing the 
original event; the signified, and emphasises instead its status as a representation 
of a representation, and so on. 
 
So far we have been examining how Federman creates a fictional realm consisting 
of two (fairly) distinct levels that co-exist, thus allowing for an extra-diegetic 
position in which we find the inventor. Consequently, the focus is primarily on 
conveying the act involved in producing a narrative (‘how’) rather than the 
finished product itself (‘what’). In this way, Double or Nothing not only 
dramatises but also clearly foregrounds the existential aspect of the imaginative 
process of production: the idea of reinterpreting and coming to terms with the 
traumatic experiences of his past through the act of ‘storyfication’. This is 
manifested in the interactions between the two tiers, i.e., the dialogue between the 
writer and his discourse as the former goes through the painstaking process of 
approaching the historical ‘truth’ by turning it into a story. Here, the importance 
                                                 
23 First published in 1958. 
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of the (symbolic) location for the inventor’s undertaking, the room, also remains 
crucial to the project, since it is “when you’re alone in a room […] you have to 
face the facts and solve your own problems it’s a matter of survival” (Federman 
1971:178). Never seeking to hide the fact that these autobiographical elements are 
always introduced within a fictional context, the notion of the teller as the 
authorial creator of his text remains possible for us to believe in. However, this 
idea cannot be maintained throughout Double or Nothing, which I will examine 
below. 
 
Transitioning: from possible to impossible worlds 
The fictional universes that Federman creates are by no means simple. They might 
appear simple at first, but as I want to illustrate in the following, Federman soon 
deprives us of any stable centre of orientation, leaving us with worlds that are 
most suitably described as ‘impossible’. Double or Nothing is a text that lays no 
claim to any rules or conventions, but frequently informs us that in fact, “anything 
can happen in this type of discourse” (127) – and it does. The only rules that 
seemingly apply to the contradictory and highly illogical universe(s) of this novel 
are the ‘rules’ of fiction. As we are nearing the end of the novel, all notions of 
logic are simply no longer sufficient as a means of making sense of this text. At 
this point, the frame-breaking activities become so radical that we can no longer 
rely on a conventional reading protocol. For the reader, this is a challenging text 
that encourages (and demands) active reader participation in order for it to 
‘mean’. 
 
Towards the end of the story, the initial framework consisting of four 
distinguishable voices (established above) is radically undermined, starting with 
the two lowest levels of the discourse. As the teller claims how “eventually he 
[the protagonist] too would lock himself in a room with noodles to crap out his 
existence on paper” (124), it becomes evident that the two of them are 
overlapping. This is no surprise as it has been stated repeatedly throughout the 
embedded story as well as the framing meta-narrative. We already sense this 
gradual merging in statements such as, “Like that suit I bought at Klein’s. His first 
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American suit. $48.98. With the 50 bucks I had he didn’t even have enough for a 
tie” (18). While such assertion may indicate the commencement of the fusing of 
the teller and the protagonist, we can never really be sure. It may just as well be a 
narrator who, for a moment, is unable to maintain an aesthetic distance. Adding to 
this uncertainty is also the fact that this is a teller with a strong inclination towards 
employing an unstable point of view. Contemplating whether to use first or third 
person singular, for instance, the inventor decides to try out both techniques and 
concludes that it “comes out the same” (99). Hence, he alternates freely between 
the two points of view, making it somewhat impossible for us to determine whose 
story we are being presented with. We are left in a state of undecidablity, since we 
cannot really distinguish the two ontological realms that each of these beings 
supposedly inhabits. 
  
Moving the merging of these two different realms from a thematic to a formal 
level, we really begin to sense the collapse of the initial setup. Preoccupied once 
again with making a list, we find the inventor speaking in first person singular, 
“But before I forget make a list of all the people he meets during his first five 
years in America” (161). A list of names follows and then, without further ado, 
the activity of listing these people suddenly takes place one level below the plane 
on which the inventor supposedly is situated, “And just as he was thinking of 
possible names for all the people he would eventually meet during his first few 
years in America the girl with the legs gets up from her seat to get off the 
subway” (161). We are thus literally descending down (one level) into the subway 
where both the telling of the protagonist’s story and the story itself now seem to 
take place. A little later on, we encounter yet another strange instance of merging 
levels as the protagonist (or the inventor) watches the woman who is about to get 
off the subway train, “She is still standing there. Just a few seconds as if she were 
deciding whether or not she’s going to get off or stay. No kidding. She is looking 
straight at him now. No time to fuck around with lists of names themes and all 
those basic elements” (162). Short-circuiting the ontological hierarchy this way, is 
highly unsettling for the reader and thoroughly destabilises any notion of frames. 
The ‘impossible’ idea that the telling and the told are now, seemingly, taking 
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place within the same ontological realm is in fact happening before our very eyes, 
though such performance defies any concept of logic. Before this instance of 
trompe-l’oeil, we were able to maintain the idea of the inventor in an extra-
diegetic position from where we followed the difficult composition of the story. 
Now, on the other hand, the extra-diegetic ‘reality’ and the ‘reality’ of the story 
are severely confounded, having merged into one single ‘reality’. 
 
However, Federman’s frame-breaking activities do not stop here but are stretched 
even further to include all four diegetic levels, 
 
 
      (173) 
 
As the four voices are fused into one single diegetic level (or consciousness), the 
foundation upon which we rely in order for us to make sense of this discourse is 
demolished. The temporal and spatial dimensions within the novel simply cease to 
exist, thus the notion of ‘depth’ in fiction that we rely on in order for us to make 
sense of a given text is exposed as being illusory (hence Federman’s own 
classification of this novel as ‘surfiction’). It is not only the protagonist whose 
subway scene is (now) being repeated 365 days later. Having penetrated the world 
of the protagonist’s story, the three other fictional beings are also caught in this 
strange loop of time; a time span that corresponds exactly with the period of time 
that the inventor originally estimated would be sufficient for him to write his 
novel. At this point, the discourse clearly manifests itself as “a circular story” 
(121), which falls back onto itself, suggesting the prospect of endless repetition. 
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Every single time the circular story reaches a certain point of its course, it is time 
“to start all over / Right from the beginning” in order to “Get the fucking thing 
going again” (189). ‘Getting the thing going’ yet again is exactly, and 
paradoxically, how this novel ends, forever destined towards infinite regress,  
 
 
      (191) 
 
Leaving the discourse open-ended like this emphasises Federman’s ongoing 
struggle to grasp his incomprehensible past, a past that remains forever in the 
second degree – always existing only in a displaced manner. Federman fully 
acknowledges that his ongoing and stubborn attempt to make the past (and those 
who perished) present again is always in vain. Ironically, this very effort to 
comprehend his past remains 
 
 
          (139) 
 
There is no hermeneutic discovery at the ‘end’ of this story – our desire, along 
with Federman’s, to know what really happened remains unfulfilled.  
 86 
----------------------------------------[X – X – X – X]--------------------------------------- 
Concrete prose: an attempt at ‘visualising’ the unspeakable past 
As the above analysis has illustrated, everything within Federman’s irrational 
universe is eventually subsumed by language. As a result, the traditional 
demarcation between historical ‘fact’ and fiction, memory and imagination, 
ceases to exist. Double or Nothing repeatedly points to and insists on its own 
existence as a discursive construct, deliberately and explicitly manifesting itself as 
being ontologically distinct from the non-discursive and solid world. Therefore, 
we are left with the feeling that the only thing which undoubtedly does remain 
‘real’ about Double or Nothing is, in fact, its physical existence as the book we 
are holding in our hands. 
 
The physical existence of the novel is something that is foregrounded to a very 
high degree in Double or Nothing. Due to Federman’s highly innovative 
typographical outlay on each individual page, reading Double or Nothing almost 
equals a visual cinematic experience. We are literally forced to manoeuvre this 
book around as we encounter numerous textual segments that are printed 
diagonally across the page, upside-down or sideways, and instances of shaped 
typography that through their shape simulate the shape of real-life objects and 
processes. In other words, Federman clearly subverts the traditional use of 
typography and, consequently, the extreme physicality of his typographical 
designs continually disrupts the projected world(s) of his text. Although the use of 
concrete prose emphasises the ‘bookiness’ of Federman’s novels and therefore 
serves as an ironic self-representation, I would argue that employing such a 
strategy should not merely be seen as a playful jest. In fact, there is an inherent 
sense of doubleness in this novel; a constant vibration between seriousness and 
playfulness, articulation and disruption, and Federman’s use of concrete prose is 
no exception. This technique, too, becomes a way of insinuating the serious 
elements of his past that lie in wait beneath the ludic surface of his discourses. 
 
Page 7.1 of Double or Nothing (see plate 1), for instance, is referred to as 
“Digression on potatoes” in the “SUMMARY OF THE DISCOURSE” (192) at 
the very end of the book. This page appears at a moment when the inventor 
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considers whether potatoes or noodles would be the most appropriate food for his 
one-year seclusion. Having settled on noodles, this page could of course quite 
literally be seen as a “digression on potatoes”. But this is an understatement; a 
deliberate attempt at disparaging, yet again, the haunting presence of Federman’s 
unspeakable past. Also, the page number, with its “.1”, certainly suggests the 
intentional attempt of turning something highly significant into something 
insignificant. On this page, we find the sequence of the four Xs - “(X * X * X * 
X)” - that carefully inscribes the loss of Federman’s family as a visible sign. In 
placing the sign that marks the erasure of his family above a swastika so 
conspicuously large that our eyes are automatically drawn to it, Federman 
produces a short segment charged with emotion and painful loss. We find also a 
reference to one of Federman’s first attempts at putting into prose writing his 
personal experiences, the unpublished And I Followed My Shadow, as well as 
isolated clauses (glimpses) that indicate the contents of this story: “The train / The 
rats / The old man / The farm”24. “This story”, Hartl argues, “is thus told by being 
untold in a fragmentary and displaced manner as it forms the palimpsestic 
background of the novel, functioning as a kind of pretext” (emphasis original, 
Hartl 1995:55). Again, we are reminded that the story of Federman’s life is not 
only a past of unspeakable events; but also the ongoing attempt at rendering these 
experiences into words. The “…Next time” (Federman 1971:7.1) certainly implies 
Federman’s awareness that the novel in progress will not be exhaustive – it will 
not make available or render in its totality the historical ‘truth’ of his past.   
 
Federman, in other words, will be back in his room ‘next time’ – the room which, 
as previously stated, remains central to this novel. While the room’s importance is 
continuously brought to our attention on a thematic level, its significance also 
prevails on the level of the page itself. Page 1 (see plate 2), for instance, contains 
the text comprising the story which is literally framed by another discourse in 
which this text is repeated. Framing one discourse within another discourse, the 
                                                 
24 Interestingly, The Farm was the working title of Federman’s forthcoming novel, which has 
recently been renamed Return to Manure. This novel features an overt dramatisation of a mature 
Federman as he returns to France in search of the farm where he spent 3 years working for an old 
man during the war.  
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latter a verbatim repetition of the former, generates a sense of re-doubling which 
is further manifested in the form of the framing discourse. The typography has the 
shape of a rectangle, thus imitating the shape of a (potential) room and 
emphasising also on an iconic level its importance. Contents and form thus 
somewhat overlap and mirror one another. Rather than rendering invisible the 
words on the page and the book’s material dimensions, Federman foregrounds 
these by explicitly utilising them as a means of signifying and rendering concrete 
the contents of the story. Furthermore, page 101 (see plate 3) exemplifies how the 
arrangement of the printed matter functions as a visual manifestation of the 
centrality of the room. It is the repetition of “the ROOM”, literally in the middle 
of this page, that creates a sense of orderliness, or coherence, to the surrounding 
words – but also to the incoherent and fragmented structure of the novel as a 
whole. While Federman’s typographical endeavours may disrupt the imaginary 
universe we are in the process of projecting, they also, paradoxically, add 
something else to that universe by rendering its (discursive) contents concrete. 
Double or Nothing thus constantly flickers between the two realms that ultimately 
comprise the book in its totality and, in doing so, manifests its own ability to 
generate a discursive ‘reality’ while simultaneously pointing to its own 
materiality. 
 
6.3 Take It or Leave It 
Much like Double or Nothing, the ‘real’ story in Take It or Leave It remains 
untold due to radical frame-breaking techniques that constantly divert the 
direction of the narrative away from the ‘original’ story. Allegedly, this is the 
story of Frenchy (presumably the same protagonist as in Double or Nothing25), a 
French-Jewish Holocaust-orphan and immigrant who, before being shipped off to 
fight in the Korean War, embarks upon a great crossing of the American continent 
funded by money that the American army owes him. Eager to pursue this 
exploratory journey of his new country, Frenchy’s trip is nevertheless postponed 
due to a bureaucratic error. Hence, Frenchy needs to pick up the money himself 
                                                 
25 “(I suppose I’ll have to send him to the army—eventually—and then describe that period […] 
they’ll call him FRENCHY for sure)” (Federman 1971:98). 
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from Camp Drum in Upper New York State before his great crossing can 
commence. Convinced that this will only be a small delay in his itinerary, Frenchy 
soon realises that things are much more complex than he first presumed. While 
Frenchy’s adventures take him in all kinds of unforeseen directions, this 
unfortunate journey is cleverly mirrored in the actual telling of the story, delivered 
by a second-hand teller. This is not an ordinary storyteller but a second-hand teller 
who repeatedly and severely disrupts and comments on his own recitation. 
Consequently, the second-hand teller leads the story astray through various 
digressions, detours, and intense discussions with his listeners and, as a result, the 
immediate story remains a mere projection of Frenchy’s journey. Distributing the 
authorial voices on competing ontological levels, Federman not only creates a 
dialogic multi-voiced discourse and a dispersal of authority but, also, he sets up a 
narrative hierarchy so complex that eventually “all the rules and regulations are 
going down the drain” (Federman 1976:261)26, as we shall see. 
 
While Take It or Leave It also centres on ostensible autobiographical elements, 
this text, interestingly enough, starts with a (mock) disclaimer in which Federman 
(the paper-author, naturally) warns his (potential) readers that, “All the characters 
and places in this book are real, they are made of words, therefore any 
resemblance with anything written (published or unpublished) is purely 
coincidental” (7). There is no pretence in this text of being able to give us 
anything but real words. It does not purport to make itself pass for the ‘real’ and 
solid world but boldly affirms what it is: a discursive construct. In other words, 
real signifiers, and not signifieds, are strongly foregrounded in the story to come. 
Therefore, like Double or Nothing, this novel is clearly going to be ‘a real 
fictitious discourse’. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 There is no pagination in this text. Therefore, all page references to Take It or Leave It in this 
thesis will be based on my own pagination.  
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Preliminaries 
The second-hand teller, whom we initially encounter on his platform in front of an 
audience, clearly lays no claim to any authenticity or progression of the story to 
come,  
 
If you guys keep talking all the time / and at the same time / we’ll never get 
it straight! We’ll never get there! Do you think it’s easy to tell a story?       
Any story?  HEY! Particularly when it’s not YOUR story – a second-hand 
story! […] To retell a story which was already told from the start in a rather 
dubious manner. Do you think it’s easy to set it up so it looks coherent? Or 
even readable? Not to mention credible? I tell you it’s not easy. A life story 
(or even parts of it)! […] And also with the passing of time, the failings of 
memory, the deterioration and the closing of the mind, the changing of 
times, and of course my own subjective interpretation of his story […] all of 
these interfere, to a great extent, with those particular elements of the 
original story. And yet, I must tell you to the best of my knowledge what he 
told me (square brackets mine, 25). 
 
 
This is a second-hand teller who in explicit terms advises us that this is not going 
to be a simple and conventional story(telling), but clearly a postmodern 
metafictional story (within the story) that explores and unveils the act of 
producing a narrative (more specifically a life story) through the act of 
(dis)articulating that very narrative. Our second-hand teller emphasises, in 
particular, issues that concern the process of remembering and (in)accuracy, both 
in terms of the source of the story and his own (in)ability to re-tell it. Federman, in 
disclosing the problematic coming into being of the narrative to come, as well as 
the subjective aspects involved in such representation, suggests a deliberate 
attempt to break with the realist tradition. He intentionally highlights the narrative 
mechanisms and ontological boundaries - i.e., the storytelling process - that the 
realist text sets out to render invisible in order to generate the feeling that it 
represents only the story told.  
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Ontological positions (and implications) 
Placing the second-hand teller on a platform in the so-called present of the 
narrative, literally situated above Frenchy, who exists down below in the past, 
concurs with the conventional notion of an ontological hierarchy in which the 
teller inhabits a world superior to that of the told. In a similar fashion, this setup 
allows for a (fictional) temporal space between these two realms; a present 
position from which the narrating subject can look to (and rewrite) the past. With 
Federman, however, there is no certainty as regards whose voice we are hearing 
or which temporal plane a given voice may occupy. While the two voices are 
distributed by the use of different pronouns between which numerous shifts occur, 
we encounter many instances of trompe-l’oeil where we momentarily mistake one 
voice, and one ‘reality’, for another. For example, as the second-hand teller is in 
the midst of a digression in which the ‘I’ (seemingly) refers to himself, a frame-
breaking act appears to have taken place, since we suddenly realise that we are 
back to the level of the story: “so it’s agreed, I stop in New York for a few hours” 
(176). There is no indication of this transition, and we remain oblivious of it until 
the second-hand teller adds in parentheses, “(it’s the other guy talking now, keep 
alert!)” (176). Additionally, Federman refrains from using quotation marks to 
indicate direct speech and thus separate the two voices. Instead, the text continues 
to flicker between these two levels, often misleading us into mistaking one voice 
for another. While the second-hand teller does explain that, “Of necessity I must 
rearrange his tale, substitute my own voice for his voice, my person for his 
person, and even, at times, my self for his self!” (26), he leaves us little idea of 
when these substitutions take place. Foreseeing the possible difficulties that this 
may cause his listeners, the second-hand teller wonders if perhaps he should  
 
 
simply tell the tale of the I directly and forget about the I and the HE and 
the HE and the I and the HE / HE told me, etc. etc. bullshit? Why this fake 
distanciation, etc., and that double-talk in the midst of an overwise [sic] 
half-way decent recitation? (50). 
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The second-teller provides an answer to his own question later on by claiming that 
“it is by a system of double-talk that the story rises from its banality to what can 
be called a level of surfiction” (187). In other words, only by employing a mode 
of “double-talk”, does literature succeed in generating a (fictional) level of self-
reflexivity, thus encompassing two fictional realms that enable a given text to 
assert its own status as an artefact. Only by generating such “fake distanciation” 
does Federman carefully avoid the pitfalls of traditional realism, which would 
amount to “just a simple banal story” (186). As Jerzy Kutnik maintains, “[b]y 
showing little respect for the conventions of rational discourse—narrative 
authority, characterization, causation, or verisimilitude—double talk saves this 
story from falsehood, from being mistaken for what this story (a fiction) is not 
(reality)” (Kutnik 1986: 198). 
 
Moreover, the second-hand teller suddenly exits the narrative temporarily, 
claiming on his return that he was needed elsewhere to assist his “[b]uddy” 
Ronald Sukenick27 who “was having problems with his story” (Federman 
1976:300). Meanwhile, Frenchy is (involuntarily) left in charge of the recitation, 
wondering (like us), “Where the hell is the second-hand teller at this time when I 
need him the most?” (261). As Frenchy is seemingly on his own, and not quite in 
control of the story, we share his astonishment when he is joined by “a free 
auditor” (260) from the group of potential listeners situated above Frenchy, 
ontologically speaking. Taken aback by this sudden and unexpected intrusion, a 
bewildered Frenchy asks the visitor, 
 
how the hell did you manage to by-pass the second-hand teller to come 
directly here . . .  I mean . . . directly to the source? […] It’s not logical . . . 
fucks up the whole system! Imagine what will happen . . . what the 
POTENTIALS will say when they hear about this! (my square brackets, 
260). 
 
                                                 
27 The American writer Ronald Sukenick (1932-2004) was a close friend of Federman for decades. 
Sukenick published several innovative and disruptive books, such as, Up (1968), The Death of the 
Novel and Other Stories (1969), and Out (1973). In addition, he wrote several theoretical essays 
and was also the co-founder of Fiction Collective.  
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This downward movement by the “free auditor”, who both crosses the frame and 
enters a narrative plane where he does not really ‘belong’, has unsettling effects 
on us and our interpretation of the story thus far, as this completely illogical 
gesture does not correspond with our notion of the common-sensical. How is this 
transition possible? Does not Frenchy exist in the past and as an explicitly 
fictional being, and the listener, on the other hand, in the present as an inhabitant 
of an extra-diegetic world (within the fiction)? And what about the second-hand 
teller; where is this realm in which he exists alongside the ‘Real Author’ 
Sukenick? Federman’s discourse offers us no closure as the text continuously 
refuses to privilege any one part of the (conventional) dichotomies: past/present, 
told/telling, and fictional/‘real’. Rather, Take It or Leave It continues towards 
asserting itself as an increasingly self-contradictory novel. 
 
Having worked up the courage to narrate his own story, Frenchy, now on his way 
to Camp Drum (and the second-hand teller back on his platform), all of a sudden 
addresses his creator, to ask permission for the authorial voice, 
 
Hey listen! Would you mind if I told this part of the story myself? I 
mean directly. Because you see we are now coming to the climax, I 
mean the real juicy part, and it would be better, and also much 
more suspenseful if I were to speak directly – first-hand!  
 
I don’t mind (I told him, when the time comes). But can you pull it 
off? Can you handle it by yourself? I mean, remember, I am the 
one who is supposed to recite this tale second-hand. And besides, it 
is not legal, you know! What will our listeners say when they 
discover I’ve handed you the narrative voice?    
 
Please let me try! Just for a while. For this one part. It really means 
a lot to me! You’ll see, I’ll do it right!  
 
Okay! (377)  
 
 
As the second-hand teller passes over the authorial voice, he does in effect 
recognise himself as a fictional construct and we are therefore no longer able to 
maintain the notion that he and Frenchy exist on different planes. Leaving 
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Frenchy in charge of the recitation has serious consequences for the novel’s 
framework as the telling and the told become somewhat indistinguishable. As we 
follow Frenchy’s struggle to keep his Buick Special on the road, this struggle is 
mirrored in the narration, which is equally difficult for Frenchy to keep on the 
right track – or is it the other way round? We are offered no stable frame of 
reference and are, therefore, unable to determine whether this is to be read 
metaphorically or literally. Both readings seemingly apply, though our logic 
dictates that we cannot have it both ways. In the end, both journey and narration 
swerve off course and into a ditch. The form, in other words, both mirrors and 
affirms the contents of the story, and vice versa. Take It or Leave It is clearly an 
example of a very radical metafictional novel in which logic gradually gives way 
to chaos. We can no longer use our notion of rationality as a means of interpreting 
this text. 
 
Contradictions and leap-frogging 
As with most of Federman’s dramatised story-tellers, our second-hand teller is 
also a fictitious being with a strong tendency to contradict his own assertions, thus 
leaving us in an endless state of doubt and uncertainty. Arguing first that the story 
was told to him first-hand by Frenchy, as the two of them “were sitting under a 
tree” (41), this is undermined later on in the discourse as the second-hand teller 
angrily exclaims, “[Ah that damn tree is getting on my nerves]” (174). 
Consequently, he asserts his creative powers and simply alters the location of the 
story’s oral delivery, so that it apparently (now) took place “on the edge of a 
precipice, leaning against the wind” (176). The act of undermining any certainty 
as regards the point of origin of Frenchy’s story is further problematised as the 
second-hand teller suddenly claims that, “For all I know he may be imagining the 
whole thing. Dreaming it up! […] Maybe it was someone else told me the story as 
told to him (and so on) and I am getting the whole thing confused” (my square 
brackets, 175). The second-hand teller is, in other words, implying the possibility 
of endless descent as there is, seemingly, no guarantee that we can ever reach the 
original (source of the) story. Federman thus evokes a sense of infinite regress, 
leaving us wondering just how many layers of interpretation and acts of re-telling 
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the original narrative has actually passed through before it has been made 
accessible to us. As with Double or Nothing, this text brings to the fore the 
impossibility of a stable (let alone possible) demarcation between the realms of 
memory and imagination. We have no way of knowing or verifying anything for 
certain and so, it quite literally becomes a matter of taking it, or leaving it. 
 
Realising that his audience may no longer be willing to take it, the second-hand 
teller reassures them (and us) that it was only “a false start” (126). Concluding 
that he should now be able to fulfil his promise of finally reciting the ‘real’ story, 
the second-hand teller maintains that what we have been told thus far has been 
“mere padding, the launching pad for the real story!” (218). Getting the story 
going is never an easy task for Federman’s narrators. Instead, their constant 
failure to produce a narrative anywhere beyond its “launching pad” is always 
foregrounded. In this discourse we find no progression in the traditional sense 
through ‘stages’ that resemble what we commonly refer to as a stable beginning, 
middle, and end. The second-hand teller is unable to move his story forward and 
resorts instead to a particular narrative (and radical metafictional) strategy that 
allows him to skip any elements of the story that he wants to, 
 
Lucky for you that the leaping system of reading (and writing) of this 
RECI-(tation) permits you so to speak to leap (jump over if you prefer) this 
type of sordid passages (or for that matter any other passages in this story!) 
That, in fact, is the KEY to this RECI-(tation) :       THE LEAPFROG 
technique! [and you’ll never know what you’ve missed!] which allows you 
any time  anywhere here and there, freely and at random, to HOP / HOP / 
HOP / over all the details! (all emphasis original, 236) 
 
 
This technique becomes one of the guiding principles of Take It or Leave It, 
which subverts practically all principles and assumptions characteristic of more 
conventional literature. The leapfrog technique, as explained above, concerns both 
the production and the reception of the novel at hand, which is further emphasised 
by the omission of page numbers. Pagination, we are told in the “SUMMARY OF 
THE RECITATION” (6) at the onset of the novel, is “useless” since “all sections 
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in this tale are interchangeable” (6). Hence, any given section may be “inserted 
anywhere in the text” (9) at the reader’s own discretion. There is no pretence of an 
already given chronological order or plot in this discourse, but rather the notion of 
arbitrariness and fragmentariness is what we are offered. As such, the reader as an 
essential (co-)producer of the text is something that is strongly foregrounded. We 
not only witness the process of composing a narrative about someone’s past, but 
also experience this difficult process ourselves as we, much like the second-hand 
teller and his potential listeners, are forced to engage actively in the meaning-
making process. 
 
Towards the horizon 
While Take It or Leave It contains numerous playful subversions of narrative 
mechanisms and intensely flaunts its own status as fiction, we get a feeling that 
something else is discernable within this paradoxical discourse. Perhaps an 
earnest attempt to move away from and break with the past? After all, we are 
cautioned that “the interesting part of this story lies in the journey west” (218), 
and not in the destination itself. What the second-hand teller is calling attention to, 
in other words, is the process (how), and not the product (what). He exasperatedly 
adds, “Hell with the past! I’m fed up with the past, fed up with his past, my past, 
our past!” (218). While the great crossing of America functions as the story’s 
main vehicle, it may also be seen as an analogy of Federman’s impetuous flight 
from death. What characterises “Federman’s autobiographical heroes”, McHale 
asserts, is that they “are refugees from death; leaving Europe behind, with its 
associations of war and holocaust, they flee to the New World, then continue 
fleeing across the continent (or they try to, at least)” (McHale 1999:229). The 
persistent wish (and need) to keep moving is one of the motivating forces behind 
many of Federman’s tellers, and Take It or Leave It is no exception. The big 
crossing of America is naturally directed towards that ‘mythical’ and luring sunset 
in the west with its promise of a prosperous and wonderful (albeit hypothetical) 
future in which “we’ll be winners all of us” (Federman 1976:218). Similarly to the 
inventor in Double or Nothing, the second-hand teller is obsessed with producing 
an excessive amount of words and to keep the discourse moving, at least 
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symbolically, “out of sight, and over the damn horizon!” (194), even if this can 
only be achieved through “thousands and thousands of repeats and 
circumvolutions” (218). The crux of the matter is that Frenchy never reaches his 
destination but ends up in bandages after hours of surgery. In other words, the 
attempt to embrace the American dream, and break with the unspeakable past 
once and for all, does not become an actuality within the novel, but instead exists 
as a mere projection. By analogy, the second-hand teller never succeeds in getting 
his story anywhere beyond its “launching pad”, and realises to his disappointment 
that his audience has walked out on him, “Where the hell did you guys go? 
Dammit! Don’t you want to hear the rest of the story?” (426). Federman’s novel 
does not give us “the rest of the story” (despite the narrator’s many promises), but 
leaves us instead with the story of the story that could not be told. Our interest is 
naturally aroused. What is it that has triggered this obsessive flight towards the 
horizon; both on a thematic and a formal level? Why all the leap-frogging and 
countless detours? What is it that the second-hand teller is not telling us? 
 
Federman, we know, fortunately did manage to escape death, the Holocaust, and 
the war as he crossed the Atlantic as a young man and eventually became an 
American citizen. Nevertheless, the traumatic memories of his past remain with 
him, demanding to be put to rest and resolved once and for all – but they never 
can be as words simply do not suffice as a means of conveying these painful 
personal experiences. While I do agree with McHale’s idea that the endless and, 
often delirious, streams of words coming from Federman’s narrator-characters 
may be seen as symbolic parallels of Federman’s escape, I also believe that they 
function as analogies of Federman’s ongoing attempt to put his unspeakable past 
into writing. That there is a central event which language always fails to make 
present again; something that Federman both realises and accepts, and it is this 
very acceptance that is apparent through his self-conscious employment of “a 
system of double-talk” (as established above). It is by using double-talk that the 
second-hand teller, for example, reveals to us in fragments what he, ironically, 
tries not to reveal. This we observe in Take It or Leave It through the second-hand 
teller’s use of a narrative mechanism similar to that of the inventor in Double or 
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Nothing:  the re-articulation of the historical past as something that remains under 
erasure. Hence, these fragments are always paradoxically represented in the 
discourse as that which is not going to be represented.  
 
On what then do I base the assumption that there is more to this discourse than its 
ludic surface? In my view, we get a very clear indication at an early point in the 
narrative (see plate 4). Here, we are presented with a most alerting statement, 
“THE EASIEST OF COURSE WOULD BE TO BLOW my BRAINS OUT” (22), 
the capitalised typeface emphasising the urgency and extremity of the situation in 
which we find this speaking subject. Once again, Federman points to the 
impossibility of saying what he, nevertheless, must say, and explicitly moves this 
account into his somewhat habitual tense: the conditional. At this point, however, 
we remain puzzled as regards the extreme condition that seemingly lies behind the 
coming into being of this recitation. A little later on, the second-hand teller drops 
us a hint when he states the reason why he must tell us the story the way he does. 
In this connection, he argues that “there are many things which I have forgotten, 
many things which cannot be told, many things which are not tellable, many 
things of unspeakable nature!” (26). There are, in other words, certain “things” 
that inevitably are going to have great repercussions regarding the (re)presentation 
of his recitation. Despite the significance that these events have, this is a narrator 
who nevertheless makes a conscious effort to play down their significance. For 
instance, by claiming that, “[I don’t want to insist too much on the Jewish side of 
this story but one cannot avoid it altogether I just hope you guys don’t make too 
much out of it]” (223). We note that this statement is even literally bracketed off 
from the rest of the discourse by Federman’s own square brackets. 
 
Another noticeable example of Federman playing down his Jewish origin yet 
again can be found on page 40 (see plate 5). Here, the symbol of Jewishness, the 
Star of David, stands remarkably out on the page, yet its importance is 
deliberately denied and mocked by the text that forms one of the two triangles 
constituting the symbol itself, “of course I’m Jewish You guys didn’t know Look 
at my nose But that doesn’t mean that I’m some sort of fanatic about all that crap 
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about religion tradition deportation extermination etcetera et”. As we have already 
established, the act of retracting the sudden and reoccurring allusions to “the 
Jewish side of this story” (223) has the opposite effect. 
 
On other occasions, the second-hand teller does bring certain “things of 
unspeakable nature” into the story (and thus to our attention) by stating his own 
intention not to include them,  
 
I’m not going to make you weep / o-o / with all the sad stories he told me 
and yet if I wanted to tell you all the crap he told me (the trains the camps) 
if I wanted to describe in details and realistically all the misery and 
suffering he endured (the lampshades the farms the noodles) we would 
never get out of here / o-o / ah yes his entire family remade into lampshades 
(father mother sisters ah yes uncles aunts cousins too) you wouldn’t believe 
it (wiped out)! (184). 
 
 
By letting these painful elements surface within the discourse, we are reminded 
time and again that Federman’s writing is deeply anchored in the historical 
‘reality’ of the Holocaust. Only gradually are we able to piece together the few 
glimpses we get of this effaced past and, thus, begin to grasp the exceptional 
circumstances that govern and inform this story. This we also observe through 
Federman’s unique use of typography, which points to the fact that he can neither 
escape nor completely evade his traumatic past as it haunts and manifests itself on 
the many different levels within the discourse. The most striking example in Take 
It or Leave It, I would argue, is the conceptual icon we encounter on page 253 
(see plate 6). Here, Federman’s shaped typography conveys the story of the 
erasure of his immediate family on an iconic, rather than a symbolic, level. This 
segment is, probably, the closest we get to the historical ‘truth’ in Federman’s 
discourse: the unspeakable “systematic extermination” of his family. Again, the 
four Xs (here literally introduced only within square brackets) signify the present 
absence of his obliterated family. The lack of any syntactical continuity and the 
many gaps between the scattered fragments of words convey a deeply moving 
visual image of Federman’s great loss. The inefficiency of language to ever 
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express the void in Federman’s life is made apparent by the fact that the majority 
of the words are incomplete and presented to us as a combination of both English 
and French. Neither of Federman’s two languages apparently suffices as a means 
of speaking the unspeakable. This is a most conspicuous image that stays with the 
reader, remaining visible as an afterimage implanted in the reader’s mind long 
after the book has been read. 
 
6.4 A conclusion of sorts 
As we have seen, the historical act of the Holocaust plays an absolutely crucial 
role in Federman’s two surfictional novels. In both novels, Federman presents us 
with numerous key autobiographical elements around which his narrators 
constantly weave layer upon layer of digressions and interrogations in their 
attempt to understand and recover the historical ‘truth’. The past, in other words, 
both informs and motivates Double or Nothing and Take It or Leave It, as each 
novel overtly dramatises the struggling narrator-character in his desperate attempt 
at rearticulating a past of unspeakable events. Ironically, each narrator interferes 
with the story he is in the process of articulating to such extent that it never 
actually gets told. Continuously intruding upon the story in progress, the various 
instances of frame-breaking inevitably foreground the process of production, the 
telling of the story – or, in Federman’s case, the impossibility of telling the story.  
 
Both tellers, as was evident, continuously manage to swerve and direct their 
discourse away from any elements that seemingly make up the ‘real’ (hi)story. 
Double or Nothing, we noted, ends up circling its own minimal story, as the 
inventor’s calculations and lists simply get the better of him. This story therefore 
remains destined towards an endless spiralling descent as it manifests itself as a 
circular story towards the end, both on a thematic and formal level, reminding us 
of Federman’s never-ending struggle to rearticulate his unthinkable past. In Take 
It or Leave It, the second-hand teller is unable to get the ‘original’ story going and 
ends up leading his narrative astray into all kinds of unforeseen directions, thus 
never moving beyond the story’s launching pad and reaching the symbolic 
horizon. Remaining in a state of in-betweenness, this text functions as an analogy 
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of Federman’s physical flight from the Holocaust while, at the same time, it 
implies the impossibility of ever escaping that past mentally, no matter how many 
words he produces. It can never be arrested or seized; only approximated in a 
mediated form. 
 
While both texts are marked by a strong wish to break with the past 
(symbolically) and move on, the historical ‘reality’ of the Nazi genocide turns out 
to be something that cannot be escaped. Both narrators cannot drop the subject 
entirely as it is repeatedly, almost compulsively, alluded to throughout the 
discourses. In most cases, the sordid history of World War II manifests itself on 
the surface of the discourse only to be subsequently negated which, paradoxically, 
foregrounds its present absence. Consequently, the past is always represented as 
that which requires yet defies representation, as we saw. It is only present within 
the two novels in its absence; remaining forever under erasure, signalling the huge 
void in Federman’s life that continues to haunt his work and his fictional authors. 
 
Despite the present absence of the historical ‘reality’, the past has great 
repercussions for the manner in which these narrators tell their story. We find both 
of them in somewhat extreme situations and these circumstances govern their 
(in)abilities to say what they must, yet cannot, say. Federman, in other words, 
does not present us with a single and unproblematic diegesis that amounts to a 
story in the traditional sense. Instead, his novels comprise both the telling and the 
story, which means that the focus is on the actual process of producing a story 
(within the story, etcetera), rather than the story as a finished product. The crux of 
the matter is that the story of the past never gets told, leaving us with a 
representation of the painstaking attempt of turning the past into a narrative. It is 
the failure – the impossibility – of producing an account of the historical past that 
is foregrounded. 
 
We also established that due to the many instances of (often radical) frame-
breaking strategies the problematic process of transforming elements of the past 
into stories is brought to the fore. Situating his narrator-characters in an extra-
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diegetic position, trying to compose an account of the past, Federman’s novels 
also clearly point to the existential aspect of writing. That is, the quest for 
meaning and personal enlightenment through the act of storyfication remains 
crucial to these texts. Yet, we are deprived of such hermeneutic discovery since it 
is always the effort to come to terms with the traumatic past - the struggle of 
grasping and translating into something meaningful these horrific experiences - 
that is represented in Federman’s novels; never the past itself. Thus, Federman 
brings to our attention not so much the events themselves as the subjective 
processes and efforts inevitably entailed in (re-)interpreting such events as a 
means of making sense of them. The linguistic systems and the act of rewriting 
history are foregrounded, rather than the (hi)story itself. 
 
In constantly subverting the fictional framework, Federman leaves us with only 
allusions to a historical ‘truth’ that lurks beneath the textual surface. Yet, at the 
same time, he repeatedly reminds us that these novels are linguistic constructs. 
The serious issues that haunt Federman’s discourses on numerous levels can 
therefore never be validated as ‘solid’ historical facts. The overt fictionality of his 
autobiographical accounts, however, does not mean that he denies the existence of 
his past. Rather, as both novels show, he clearly acknowledges the past as 
discursive, thus it can only ever be accessed by means of textuality – always in the 
second degree.  
 
Finally, we observed how the use of concrete prose as a narrative strategy, both in 
Double or Nothing and Take It or Leave It, enables Federman to not only 
foreground the materiality of his books, but also clearly point to the fact that 
words and the traditionally static arrangement of these simply do not suffice in 
capturing the unspeakable historical act of the Nazi genocide. By literally shaping 
the linguistic material in numerous ways, Federman creates various instances of 
‘concrete sayings’ that work in a twofold manner: we can look at them like 
pictures and we can read them as prose. But no matter how we choose to read the 
many competing discourses that constitute each of his novels, the fact remains 
that Federman never tries to deceive us: his pronounced use of frame-breaking 
 103
----------------------------------------[X – X – X – X]--------------------------------------- 
strategies always points to the fictionality of the few glimpses we get of his 
traumatic past. 
 
The past (and by extension, the present and the future) may, therefore, be 
endlessly re- and de-constructed which Federman shows us by continuously 
undermining any notions of certainty. The realms of fact and fiction, memory and 
imagination, and past and present, are constantly interacting with one another, as 
Federman’s novels refuse to privilege any one of these conventional dichotomies. 
We are left with an ongoing and playful oscillation between these realms, which 
ultimately assert themselves as fictional constructs and eventually merge into one 
single diegesis. In doing so, Federman intentionally deprives us of any temporal 
and spatial stability within his universes, exposing instead such conventional 
notions as illusory. The renditions of the past that Federman offers us are, in other 
words, never exhaustive or final.  
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7.0 Conclusion to thesis: historiographic radical metafiction 
In the introduction, I challenged Hutcheon’s reading of Federman’s surfictional 
novels, which according to her, should be classified as late modernist and 
autotelic works with no grounding in ‘reality’ at all. This led her to dismiss 
Federman’s writing as historiographic metafiction – Hutcheon’s own definition of 
the postmodern novel. Disagreeing with Hutcheon’s understanding of Federman’s 
work, I proposed that his Double or Nothing and Take It or Leave It be read as 
historiographic metafiction, though clearly a more radical variant of this 
particular type of novel. That is, the main aim of this thesis was to illustrate 
through close readings of Federman’s texts that these can be classified as 
historiographic radical metafiction. In order for me to offer the said reading of 
Federman’s fiction, a comprehensive theoretical framework was called for, which 
would enable us to investigate and define related, though not synonymous, 
concepts such as postmodernism, poststructuralism, (radical) metafiction, and 
historiographic metafiction. The first part of this thesis, therefore, comprised the 
theoretical framework that formed the basis for the actual analysis in part two.  
 
Having analysed Federman’s two novels, we have established that these texts are 
marked by numerous general postmodern features, such as extreme degrees of 
self-reflexivity, conspicuous formal features, ontological implications that 
severely disrupt the narrative logic, and strong inclinations towards playfulness 
and undecidability. These features are generally brought about by Federman’s 
pronounced use of radical frame-breaking techniques, which undermines any 
notion of certainty within his texts and emphasises their status as artefacts.  
 
Federman’s texts are highly innovative and unconventional, and clearly signal a 
deliberate break with the realist tradition, which hinges on the assumption that 
language has an inherent ability to represent in an unrestricted manner the 
past/‘reality’ as it ‘really’ was/is. It goes without saying that ‘reality’ is not the 
same thing as realism. Hence, if a given text is anchored in ‘reality’ that does not 
necessarily mean that it is also grounded in literary realism. Federman’s texts are 
clearly a case in point and they challenge the ideological concepts and traditional 
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values of Western society often implied by the realist mode. Federman’s texts, as 
we have seen, are deeply anchored in, and clearly marked by, the tragic events of 
World War II. While Federman’s novels never purport to offer us exhaustive and 
final accounts of these events, which would comply with the assumptions of 
traditional realism, they are nevertheless explicitly motivated and governed by 
historical facts that continue to haunt these texts by virtue of their present absence. 
Yet, at the same time, these novels also constantly assert themselves as texts that 
are clearly aware of their own fictionality. Federman’s discourses thus point 
inward and outward simultaneously, which, as we recall, is a central defining 
feature of Hutcheon’s concept of historiographic metafiction.  
 
I have shown how both Double or Nothing and Take It or Leave It are 
characterised by this inherent doubleness, which is repeatedly manifested in these 
novels’ persistent and reciprocal interplay between memory and imagination, 
teller and told, fact and fiction, as well as history and story. Federman’s novels set 
up demarcations between such traditionally distinct ontologies only to 
subsequently undermine these, leaving us flickering between internal and external 
fields of reference of which both seemingly apply. In my view, this is not a 
complete rejection of reference. Rather it can be seen as a severe problematisation 
and rethinking of this very concept, which is generated by Federman’s mode of 
‘double-talk’; the fictional distance that his novels establish, thus allowing them to 
move beyond self-reflexivity. I would argue, that Federman emphasises and 
investigates the problem of reference even further by his use of concrete prose, 
which brings to our attention the explicit attempt at articulating the (hi)story in an 
alternative manner. As a result, these books make us think about how language 
functions by laying bare the very ideological meaning-making mechanisms at 
work in Western discourses. Federman shows us that there are different ways in 
which any given historical event may be imbued with meaning through linguistic 
systems, and that no one version offers us an unproblematic and unrestricted 
access to a single historical ‘truth’. In doing so, he suggests that the official 
historical record is nothing but a construct and, therefore, it may be revised and 
rewritten in various ways that may not necessarily comply with the hegemonic 
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discourses of Western society. The Holocaust and the extermination of 
Federman’s immediate family do not make sense and this is reflected in his novels 
which, similarly, refuse to make sense by not conforming to any notion of 
Western reasoning.  
 
These novels, in other words, cannot merely be considered personal aesthetic 
statements, as Hutcheon suggests. There is an intention behind Federman’s usage 
of innovative and playful techniques and the chaotic nature of his accounts, and 
this intention, I would argue, is not autotelic. Rather, these unconventional 
narrative strategies are strongly imbued with adversarial qualities that are brought 
about by Federman’s deliberate refusal to conform to the realist mode of writing. 
His texts overtly and consistently depart from the norm and, by doing so, they 
insinuate that the realist mode – predominant within historical accounts - is 
outdated and no longer pertinent. Linearity, coherence, objectivity, presence, and 
logic are all unmasked as illusory and culturally determined constructs, projected 
onto the world in our attempt to make sense of it. We find none of these 
traditionally valued concepts (or constructs) in Federman’s surfictions, as these 
experimental texts show us instead that the past is only available to us in a 
fragmented and nonsensical form. Therefore, I would argue that his novels 
function as social and political acts of subversion by virtue of their constant 
refusal of rationality and coherence, thus reflecting the absurdity and irrationality 
of the Holocaust and providing alternative narratives that act in opposition to 
official history. 
 
Federman may also be situated within both of the two postmodern currents that 
Maltby distinguishes between (see section 2.7). Being acutely concerned with the 
individual’s inability to ever escape language as a meaning-making apparatus, 
Federman’s novels generally explore the possibilities of language. This is 
particularly noticeable in the obsessive attempt at recovering a personal past of 
horrific events that can only be approached through (unreliable) sign systems, 
particularly noticeable in Double or Nothing with its claustrophobic environment 
and emphasis on introspection. Yet, at the same time, we have also seen how his 
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discourses refuse to conform to ideological notions of Western hegemony, which 
is brought about by Federman’s disruption of traditionally valued concepts and 
official discourses, most noticeably historical accounts, which also makes him a 
dissident postmodern writer. In true Federman-style, then, both labels seemingly 
apply simultaneously.  
 
Despite the radical metafictional impulses and persistent subversion of the 
commonsensical discernable in Federman’s writing, Double or Nothing and Take 
It or Leave It both leave us in a state of undecidablity that hinges on the constant 
and reciprocal interplay between fact and fiction. So when one of Federman’s 
many voices in Double or Nothing claims that “you’re getting everything 
confused […] his story and my story” (Federman 1971:65), the striking pun on 
“history” most certainly suggests that his surfictions can be considered 
fictionalised versions of history that are explicitly characterised by a parodic twist. 
They are, in other words, historiographic radical metafictions. 
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Summary of thesis 
This thesis disagrees with Linda Hutcheon’s conviction that Raymond 
Federman’s surfictional novels cannot be considered historiographic metafictions. 
Postulating that Federman’s writing is completely void of any grounding in the 
social and historical discourses we refer to as our ‘reality’, Hutcheon argues that 
his novels are autotelic and anti-referential. I, on the other hand, argue throughout 
this thesis that Federman’s Double or Nothing and Take It or Leave It are marked 
by an inherent doubleness that corresponds to Hutcheon’s very defining feature of 
historiographic metafiction. Therefore, I propose that these novels be read as 
historiographic radical metafictions, and that Federman’s writing is strongly 
imbued with oppositional impulses characteristic of postmodern practices.  
 
Considering Federman’s novels postmodern and subversive, I argue that 
postmodernism be defined as a period concept characterised by a contemporary 
distrust of and opposition towards traditional Western verities and ideologies, 
which is reflected in postmodern aesthetic practices. ‘Reality’ is no longer 
considered a natural given to be discovered, but rather it exists to us only as a 
discursive construct. Metafictional writing, I suggest, manifests this contemporary 
view by deliberately pointing to its own status as a linguistic construct, posing 
ontological questions about its relationship to the empirical world. This concern is 
also noticeable in Hutcheon’s concept of historiographic metafiction, which 
focuses specifically on questioning our absolute knowability of the past. The 
existence of the past in such discourses is not negated. Rather, they suggest that 
our accessibility to the historical past is always only through texts.  
 
In the light of these theoretical concepts, I analyse Federman’s two novels with 
specific focus on how the past is represented and approached in his postmodern 
autobiographical accounts. I show how Federman’s consistent use of radical 
frame-breaking techniques enables him to create numerous different ontological 
levels within his texts that all engage in dialogues, ultimately leading to a 
confrontation with a (fictional) past of unspeakable events. These novels, I 
conclude, are clearly marked and governed by the tragic events of World War II, 
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which become particularly noticeable through the narrator-characters’ constant 
intrusions into their stories in progress. While these fictional tellers never succeed 
in articulating the ‘real’ (hi)story of the past, there is a strong urgency within these 
texts of a desperate need to rediscover the past in the attempt to grasp it. This, 
however, proves impossible, as Federman shows us how language simply does 
not suffice as a means of rendering meaningful the horrific ‘reality’ of the 
Holocaust and the extermination of his family. Allowing only a few glimpses of 
the ‘real’ (hi)story to surface now and again within these chaotic and irrational 
universes, Federman’s oppositional qualities are exposed. I conclude that by 
refusing to make sense and adhere to the realist mode, Federman’s surfictional 
writing clearly distances itself from the rational and objective world-view implied 
by this tradition. To Federman the Holocaust does not make any sense, which is 
clearly manifested in his self-cancelling discourses that refuse to comply with 
conventional Western ideology and its official history. Federman’s story of his 
unthinkable past cannot be told, but that too, in my view, is a way of telling.  
 
My ultimate conclusion is that despite their extreme self-reflexivity and deliberate 
break with literary realism, Federman’s two novels nevertheless remain deeply 
anchored in historical facts that continue to haunt his discourses by virtue of their 
present absence. Thus, these novels may be classified as historiographic radical 
metafictions.  
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Blurb 
 
 
This MA thesis presents close readings of two of Raymond 
Federman’s surfictional novels, with specific focus on how the 
past is approached and represented in his postmodern 
autobiographical accounts. 
 
Disagreeing with Linda Hutcheon, the thesis proposes that 
Federman’s surfictions be read as historiographic metafictions, 
though clearly a more radical variant of this type of novel. 
Through numerous textual examples, Federman’s writing is 
shown to be strongly imbued with oppositional impulses 
characteristic of postmodern practices. 
 
Moreover, the thesis comprises a vast theoretical framework 
with chapters on concepts such as postmodernism, 
poststructuralism, (radical) metafiction, and historiographic 
metafiction. 
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